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INTRODUCTION
As a very young adult I continually experienced a fascinating dis-
connect with my father. I was a burgeoning activist, looking to
environmental justice and civil rights as causes around which to build my
world. I was decidedly Left, my father on the Right. I was a Democrat,
* B.A. 1998, Williams College; J.D. 2002, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. I am grateful to Professor Angela Harris, University of California,
Berkeley, for her encouragement, enthusiasm, and most importantly, her patience.
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long before I could make any true or actual demonstration of that fact.'
My dad, when he did not remind me that a person's vote is his own busi-
ness, would always intimate, if not explicitly declare, that he voted the
Republican ticket. Shock and dismay often overtook me; a heated debate
would ensue, but no resolution would be reached. We would remain,
staunchly, at opposite ends of the spectrum.
Following each debate a tremendous feeling of frustration and disap-
pointment resonated within me. This feeling, however, was not a result of
a vote lost for "my" Democratic candidate. The frustration ran much
deeper. I could not understand how a Black man in our society could
seek and find similarity in vision-much less true representation-from a
party whose interests seem antithetical to not only the political interests
of Black America but to our needs as they pertain to economic, civil and
social rights in this country. What kind of power or political voice could
be found in a party whose actions many in the Black and Brown- com-
munities often deemed odious and oppressive?
It was not until one particularly contentious argument that my father
went beyond partisan politics to explain to me politics, pure and simple.
Black people in America would never get anywhere politically, he rea-
soned, if their loyalties remained in one camp. The sure way for both
parties to ignore our interests would be for us to remain wholly uncon-
troversial. In other words, Black people can get what we want only if we
present ourselves as true and shrewd consumers in the political market-
place. We can get the best product only if we are truly shopping. Shrewd
consumerism will force political parties to court our vote, then we could
determine who is addressing "our" issues most vigilantly. The question
would be who has the best product rather than if there is any viable
product at all.
My dad had introduced a notion of political activity that made sense
on its face. Though I knew he would remain in the conservative camp
irrespective of its efficacy in the political marketplace with regard to Black
needs, for the first time I was forced to consider the veracity of that
idealless, calculating action. If Black people were not so loyal to the De-
mocratic Party, perhaps they could be beneficiaries of the shameless
wooing that only politicians know how to perform. Being swing voters
would not really mean that we were without conviction or that we were
not making an intelligent choice, it would mean that we were making the
cleverest move. Despite the "smartness" of this move, however, there was
something unsettling to me about this approach to the vote. The vote
1. Today, I am no longer wedded to the Democratic Party, having grown weary of
the Party after accumulating frustrations over my short six-year voting history. I no longer
have any party loyalties, though I have moved farther Left as both major parties have
moved Pight.
2. 1 use the term "Brown" to broadly identify non-White and non-Black communi-
ties, including Latinos and South and Southeastern Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders.
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would no longer be an expression of true belief, in my view, it would be-
come a purely instrumental and meaningless gesture.Yet after entering the
political arena and becoming increasingly frustrated with the consistent
elision of race and its contingent issues in American politics, the meaning
of the vote has become unclear. Is it the purest disposition of one's con-
victions or is it a bargaining chip to be employed with unsentimental
shrewdness?
This article attempts to answer that question with the interests of the
Black community foregrounded throughout the inquiry. Part I begins
with a discussion of Black America's party affiliation in recent history. The
Democratic Party, enjoying decisive Black support since the 1960s, has
done little by way of actual representation and vigorous advocacy on be-
half of Black interests. Indeed, Blacks have endured a series of insults from
a Party that has continually taken political communities of-color for
granted. Notwithstanding the decades of disregard and the likelihood of
even greater neglect to come, Blacks are doing little to truly change the
destructive patterns in ]Democratic Party representation. This endemic
inactivity is avoidable; nevertheless, Black loyalties are resilient.
Part II demonstrates that Latinos, having suffered a similar disregard
of their interests, are making political inroads that are quite enviable. Their
increasing willingness to become cross-voters when it best meets their
political needs makes them more attractive as political consumers. The
result is that the Republican Party, in notably shocking departures from
the traditional party line, is offering a better product for the Latino con-
munity. In response, the Democratic Party will increasingly have to offer
more coherent and substantive support and representation to compete in
the Latino marketplace.
Part III argues that Blacks might be able to commandeer similar
changes in the political marketplace if they were to consider casting their
votes for the Republican Party. However, the consistency in voting pat-
terns and loyalty that marks the Black community suggests that the act of
voting for the other side is not so easy. This article argues that the mean-
ing of the vote in the Black community is unique because it represents
the true disposition of one's ideological beliefs. For Blacks, the vote is not
merely a political instrument. Rather, it holds in it the sentimental and
powerful duties and rewards of citizenship, which Black people in Amer-
ica were prevented from enjoying, by both law and practice, throughout
much of American history. In addition, and perhaps more importantly,
individualist notions of the right to vote trump strong community no-
tions of action in the polls. For Blacks, however, the shared experience of
profound exclusion and enduring struggle is what unites the comnmunity.
With such ties created and re-created in American society, the vote can
never be a mere tool; and the goal sought by the vote can never be solely
about individual gain. As a result, until the Republican Party provides
SPRING 2003]
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more attractive and sincere politics, the Black community will remain, for
better or worse, with the better ideological fit.
The article concludes with a discussion of the true villain in party
politics: the two-party system. As long as American politics remain se-
curely bound to the two-party system, Blacks will remain a voting block;
a block that may shift, but a block nonetheless. And although this appears
to be to our strategic disadvantage, allowing conviction to direct us, as
well as a deep respect for the intense struggle for the franchise, will for-
ever be a noble posture.
I. AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE
A. The Critique
Carroll Robinson, a Black woman and an active member of the
Texas Democratic Party, remarks that despite over 120 years of the fran-
chise "African Americans collectively are still a very politically
unsophisticated group of people.-3 Her work indicates that since Blacks
made the move from the Republican Party of Lincoln to the Democratic
Party under Franklin Roosevelt, Black people have consistently given at
least eighty-three percent of their vote to the Democratic Party. This vot-
ing pattern demonstrates a menacing consistency in party affiliation.
Robinson was writing her remarks specifically in response to the
treatment of newly elected Black Congressman Gary Franks (R-CT) by
the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC).' The largely Democratic CBC
found the presence of ultra-conservative Franks in their ranks as disquiet-
ing at best, onerous at worst. The CBC's treatment of Franks was so
exclusionary that Robinson deduced, with regret, that Blacks appear to be
the only group that cannot disagree politically "without being disagree-
able and vindictive towards one another.'6 Robinson found this reality to
be both disturbing and ultimately to the disadvantage of the community
as a whole:
Our "leaders" myopic and irrationally overemotional com-
mitment to a belief in and advocation of a "single-sided"
view of bipartisan politics over the greater communal self-
interest of African Americans as the sole solution to the
problems confronting us has resulted in our community be-
coming a "ONE PARTY STATE" that is neglected and
3. Carroll G. Robinson, Its Tine to Put Communal Interest Ahead of Partisan Politics, 19
T. MARS-ALL L. REV. 109, 109 (1993). Robinson is a self-identified Democrat but offers,
'Jnlotwithstanding that fact, I am an African American first and foremost." Id.
4. Id. at 113.
5. Id. at 109.
6. Id. at 111.
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disrespected by our so-called "FRIENDS," and for the most
part ignored by those we have been told are our enemies.
The lack of sophistication in the Black community comes from its
unwillingness to embrace the realities of the political game. Party affilia-
tion, Robinson instructs, is not an end in and of itself, but rather a means
to success on Election Day. A voter may choose to vote for one party or
another strictly based upon ideology or some sort of greater strategic play.
While most Blacks vote based on ideology, Robinson points out that ide-
ology is a distant second to the importance of strategic play. In fact,
ideology is largely irrelevant in the contemporary political arena,8 a lesson
many White voters have learned with significant success.
As a political phenomenon, White swing voters have been a formi-
dable group throughout history. Contemporary manifestations have been
dubbed "Reagan-Bush Democrats" or "Perot voters."' Though lacking a
descriptive appellation, the White swing voter was hotly sought after in
the most recent election between George W Bush and Al Gore.' On the
other hand, Blacks have always been decisively outside of the swing-voter
category. As Robinson explains, Blacks "adamantly, emotionally and stub-
bornly refuse to cross party lines and are therefore generally taken for
granted and disrespected.""
Robinson is not the only Black person to identify community vot-
ing patterns as a cause of poor Black political representation. Lani Guinier,
a few years earlier, reasoned:
[T]he swing vote theory ... presumes inter-party competi-
tion. When minority interests are not only distinct but
antagonistic to those of the white majority, and when one
political party presumes black loyalty -while the other pan-
ders to racial hostility, such representation is merely
symbolic. Thus, black interests are neither actually nor virtu-
ally represented.'
2
Writing at the close of the Reagan administration, Guinier was re-
sponding to a political environment that looked particularly bleak for
7. Id. at 114.
8. See id. at 112. According to Robinson "[i]f party affiliation truly meant more, e.g.
ideological purity, then why are there conservative, neo-conservative, moderate, liberal,
progressive and 'new' Democrats .... The answer is easy; the Democratic and Republican
parties are simply two different sides of the same coin,'majority' rule." Id.
9. Id. at 114.
10. See generally Paul Frymer, Race, Representation and Elections: The Politics of Parties and
Courts, in AMERICAN PotITIcs AND Socinry TODAY 56 (Robert Singh, ed., 2002).
1. Robinson, supra note 3, at 111-12.
12. Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HAV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 393, 429 (1989)[hereinafter Guinier, Keeping the Faith].
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Black America. 3 For many commentators in the Black community, that
political environment does not look much brighter today.With respect to
his work on President Clinton's Race Initiative," Christopher Edley Jr.
found that any policy action the administration might take would be in-
evitably preempted by America's political and racial climate. Commenting
on the political environment at the close of the twentieth century, Edley
explained with frustration that:
[T]he problem is that if I give you my bold idea for saving
inner cities, that bold policy idea will be dead the moment
it falls from my lips because there is no moral or political
consensus for the bold policy measures needed to make a
meaningful difference. The simple proposition is that one
reason we do not have that consensus is that to take bold
measures we have to care about each other, and color gets in
the way of caring."
The color line remains bright. Therefore, in order to create a more ac-
commodating environment for itself, the Black Community must play the
strategic game with its goals always in mind.
One group that has purportedly kept such goals at the forefront is
the CBC. The motto of the Congressional Black Caucus is "Black folks
have no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, just permanent inter-
ests." 6 Yet the unwavering allegiance to the Democratic Party by the
Black community and leaders alike has consistently defied the very man-
date of the CBC. For Robinson, this has caused great consternation. She
argues that the community refuses to accept the "reality of two party poli-
tics and its attendant implications in terms of political empowerment."'
7
For the Black community as a whole, this has produced an incredible dis-
advantage. In order to overcome this disadvantage the community must
be willing to "adopt a bipartisan strategy for playing 'the game' of politics
within the confines of democratic republicanism."' 8
13. Guinier remarked, "In light of the Reagan record of voting enforcement, racial
polarization of the electorate and white politicians' limited response, both political parties
must affirmatively give black voters a reason to 'keep the faith.'" Id. at 430.
14. President Clinton's Race Initiative was an initiative to open a national dialogue on
multiracial issues in contemporary America. Its purpose was to better understand the
needs of all citizens in America's broad racial spectrum, with the possibility of substantive
policy responses in mind. See, e.g., http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/june97/
race.htnil (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
15. Christopher Edley, Jr., Color at Century's End: Race in Lai, Policy, and Politics, 67
FORDHA L. REV. 939, 955 (1998).
16. Earl Black, Power by the Nunibers:Ant Insider's Look at the Congressionial Black Caucus,
WASH. PosT,Jan. 7, 1993, at C3.
17. Robinson, supra note 3, at 111.
18. Id.
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The rules are clear, according to Black Congressman William L. Clay,
who laid out the ground rules for political participation:
If blacks are to unshackle the chains of bondage that bind us
to a status of economic and political slavery, we must learn
the basic rules of the political game ... Rule number one is,
take what you can, give up what you must. Rule number
two is, take it whenever, however, and from whoever. Rule
number three is, if you are not ready to abide by the first
two rules, you are not qualified for a career in politics."
In order to effectively represent Black interests, the Black leadership
should strictly adhere to the CBC motto and follow the "rules of the
game" without sentimentality.
B. The Notion of Strategic Voting
The ultimate goal of a political party is to win elections. Whether or
not there is a fundamental ideological mandate at issue in a race, the win-
ning of elections is vital to the mission and survival of a political party.
The vote, as a necessary component of electoral success and a tool with
which one can influence the movement of an entire party, must be cast
with the election itself in mind. Although voting can be an ideological
statement, it is used more effectively as a way to influence a party by
promising electoral success. Professor Frymer reminds:
When parties lose elections, particularly when they have
sustained losing streaks, the necessity to win becomes more
and more dominant, and the party tends to unify more
clearly around strategies directed at changing their losing
ways. Ideologues who prefer to maintain policy agendas at
the cost of winning are marginalized by those who can em-
phatically proclaim that winning through compromise is
better than ending up with nothing at all.20
With the relatively lackluster success of the Democratic Party,-' the
margins are a familiar location for the Black electorate. That location is
made worse by the great appeal ofWhite swing voters. The White swing
voter has inspired numerous ideological compromises and moved the
19. Black, supra note 16, at C3.
20. Fryrner, supra note 10, at 67.
21. The past presidential administrations are a good example of the successes of the
Democratic Party in nationwide elections. Between 1968 and 1992, there was only a sin-
gle one-term Democratic administration under President Carter.
22. Terry Smith, Race And Money In Politics, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1469, 1515-16 (2001).
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party farther Right with respect to civil rights initiatives.23 For example, a
study conducted in a suburb of Detroit on traditional Democratic voters
swinging to Republican tickets showed that at least a sizable portion of
party movement was due to race politics. 4 Swing voters "express[ed] a
profound distaste for Blacks, a sentiment that pervades almost everything
they think about government and politics.... These sentiments have im-
portant implications for Democrats, as virtually all progressive symbols
and themes have been redefined in racial and pejorative terms. 2 5
The Democrats have certainly responded to this activity. An under-
emphasis on ideology and a focus on election victory have influenced
Democratic strategy throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Almost consecutive
losses to Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush pulled the Democratic platform
away from the ideologically based "Great Society" of the 1960s.24 While
the entire party moved closer to the middle, moderates of the Party
moved further right; and after the decisive 1984 presidential loss, the
moderates created the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). The DLC
is noted for its departure from the civil rights and social spending agenda
of the earlier Party.Without question, this strategic move by the Democ-
ratic Party was meant to woo back the swinging middle, which had been
won over by the Republican Party in previous elections. This cross-over
activity by White voters has been recognized not only by parties, who act
accordingly, but also by more stable members of the political and govern-
ing community. Justice Breyer, delivering the opinion of the Court in
Easley v. Cronartie, 27 noted: "[W]hite voters registered as Democrats 'cross-
over' to vote for a Republican candidate more often than do African
Americans, who register and vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of
the time."'2 This swing tendency has led to greater representation of the
interests of these swing-voters.
Unlike their White counterparts, Blacks do not swing and are instead
locked into the Democratic Party. They are contending with the incon-
stancy ofWhite Democratic voters, and it seems logical to conclude that
the only way for Blacks to gain some political power is to begin to shift.
This type of "defection" would not be unusual for a racial or ethnic
23. See id.
24. Frymer, supra note 10, at 67 (quoting Stanley B. Greenberg, "Report on Democ-
ratic Defection," report to the Democratic Party, Apr. 15, 1985. p. 13). See also Smith, supra
note 22, at 1516 (discussing Al Gore's "incessant pursuit" of White swing voters in the
2000 election noting his lack of attention to Black concerns, including drug sentencing
disparities and the racially disparate impact of the death penalty).
25. Frymer, supra note 10, at 67.
26. Id.
27. 532 U.S. 234,245 (2001).
28. Id. at 245.
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minority in the Democratic Party.2" However, neither a shift nor a mean-
ingful threat to do so has occurred in the Black community. If a shift is
vital to effecting change in the Democratic Party, Blacks will never ad-
vance politically if they continue to demonstrate a mob-like loyalty.
II.THE MEANING OF BLACK POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION
The telos of slavery was utter dependence, best achieved by depriving
the victims of any sense of their history.3 '
Observing the current political party affiliation of Black America,
many might be surprised to know that less than a century ago the
Republican Party was the party of choice of the Black constituency. What
has been consistent, however, is the "utter dependence" with which
Blacks have historically relied on a given political party. In a manner that
seems as binding and blindly consistent as servitude, the Democratic Party
has benefited from the plentiful fruits of the Black vote, while giving little
or nothing in return.31 In many respects, the telos of slavery mirrors the
political power dynamic of the Democratic Party with respect to the
Black community today. This section will discuss the history of this rela-
tionship and the implications this relationship holds for Black voters in
the future.
A. The Failure of Democratic Representation
We Democrats have this habit of too often forming a firing squad in
a circle.3
29. Jews and Italians, for example, had the same experience with the party one hun-
dred years ago. See, e.g., Mara Liasson, Concern wilthin the Democratic Party about Losing the
Hispanic Vote, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO MORNING EDITION, Nov. 9,2001.
30. James U. Blacksher, Anterican Political Identity and History (reviewing "The Right to
Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States" By Alexander Keyssar), 95 Nw.
U. L. REV. 715, 725 (2001)(quoting Laurence Thomas, Group Autonomy and Narrative Iden-
tity: Blacks and Jews, in BLACKS AND JEWS 286 (Paul Berman, ed., 1994)).
31. This is also true with respect to actual access by Black candidates to positions
within the political structure. Earl Black informs us that as late as 1964 there were only
five Black members of Congress, all in the House of Representatives: William Dawson of
Illinois, Adam Clayton Powell of New York, Charles Diggs of Michigan, Robert Nix of
Pennsylvania and Augustus Hawkins of California. Black, supra note 16.
32. Joel Siegel, Stunned Democrats Face Deep Racial Divide: Rift fron Runoff Threatens
Gov Run, N.Y DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 2001, at 5 (quoting David Dinkins, the first Black
Mayor of NewYork City as he commented on the Democratic loss in the 2001 NewYork
City mayoral race). See infra Part III.B for a further discussion of the race politics of this
election.
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History reveals that the Democrats had virtually no access to the
Black vote for the entire first half of the twentieth century. From the time
Blacks first won the vote, they had been loyal to the Republican party of
Abraham Lincoln. The post-Civil War Republicans seemed to espouse
and support Black socio-economic interests. On the other hand, the De-
mocratic Party was notable for a membership consisting largely of White
southerners who were staunchly committed to White supremacy, mani-
fested by Jim Crow legislation and other discriminatory political
measures. "The Democratic Party, the party of Southern slave owners and
their Northern sympathizers, long before it was the party of FD.R. and
J.FK., is fundamentally a White institution.' '33 Accordingly, Blacks did not
vote for Democrats until Franklin Roosevelt ran for his fourth term in
office in 1944. 34 Since then, Blacks have remained firmly planted in the
Democratic corner. In the last ten national elections since 1964, at least
80% of Black votes have been cast for candidates of the Democratic
Party.35
Given the tremendous and unwavering support of the Democratic
Party by the Black community, one would assume their interests would be
adequately represented. However, the Democratic Party participates in a
nationwide habit of omitting race and the civil rights issues from con-
temporary political discourse. Democrats do this so as not to "startle"
either conservative or centrist White voters "while delicately balancing
subtle race-specific appeals at different moments to both black and white
},06
voters.
Democrats cannot deny the advantages gained by Black support; the
instances are countless. As Guinier notes, "this solid base of black Democ-
ratic support" has aided Democrats from Louisiana to California. 37 For
example, in 1986, the Democrats were able to gain the majority in the
Senate due to the strength of four mostly southern victories. 38 Also, the
defeat of ultra-conservative Supreme Court hopeful Robert Bork,
33. Harry Kresky, City Power, Green Shows the Democrats' One Trie Color, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 25, 2001, at A47.
34. Id.
35. Frymer, supra note 10, at 64.
36. Id. Frymer argues that the deleterious effects of Democrats' pattern of pandering
to white swing voters are exacerbated by the two party system. Id. at 65. See also Guinier,
Keeping the Faith, supra note 12; Lani Guinier, No ivo Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413 (1991).Within this two-party structure Blacks have very little
chance to choose a party that will remain as loyal to their interests as Black people are to a
particular party. Frymer, supra note 10, at 65. Frymer later describes the Republican Party
as being almost totally disconnected from Black voters and suggests that they try to win
elections by "making direct appeals to white voters without portraying the party as out of
the mainstream on race matters." See id. at 64 (arguing that both Republican and Democ-
rat approaches "leave African American interests severely underrepresented"). Id.
37. Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 414 n.93.
38. Id. at 414.
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dubbed the "Democrats' greatest symbolic success in recent years, was
largely due to Black political activity. In the 1988 presidential election
between Michael Dukakis and George H. Bush, Dukakis received almost
ninety percent of the Black vote.H' Black support of Dukakis was even
more decisive when one looks at the deographic breakdown of
Democratic support in June 1988 At that time, Dukakis had a ten-point
lead over Vice President Bush. The lead was bare akiong White males and
only slightly better among White women. As with other presidential
elections, the Black vote was pivotal. According to Professor Guinier,"[i]t
was when the votes of blacks-the most loyal DePocrats-were added,
that Dukakis' lead became formidable.mo w
Despite this tremendous support for the Democratic Party, however,
Black issues have taken a backseat in its political agenda. For example, in
the 1988 election in which the Black vote was so decisive, controversial
issues like welfare or more general Black interests were "omitted or
masked in euphefism" by the candidate. 2 Guinier observes, "the vision
Democrats offered in 1988 hardly mentioned, even indirectly, problems of
race, and it deliberately ignored connections between racism and pov-
,43
erty.
Forced to be satisfied with incremental advances made by pressuring
the Democratic Party, Black politicians have also had to fight hard for a
voice and power within the party as well as the political communities
they represent. Without power derived from outside the party structure,
Black politicians would be unable to effect true change for the Black
compmunity. Congressman Clay explains that "[b]y the rid-eighties our
influence and power in the House of Representatives, mainly because of
the seniority system, had increased to such an extent that the Democratic
leadership had no alternative but to accommodate us in order to advance
their own legislative agenda."" This movement by Black politicians as well
as the "integration of the Congressional Black Caucus into the machinery•45
of House Democratic leadership" was quite a significant achievement.
Still, support of Black leaders has historically been weak, at best, in the
Democratic Party. In the 1988 primary, for example, Jesse Jackson's sec-
ond-place finish was unable to reframe the Democratic agenda. Moreover,
ties to Jackson have been deemed a disadvantage, such as when Ronald H.
39. Id.
40. Bush received nearly sixty percent of the White vote nationwide, and over seventy
percent in the Deep South. Id. at 414-15.
41. Id.at 415 n.95.
42. Id. at 416 n.96.
43. Id. at 415. Issues such as welfare were considered "controversial" and therefore
avoided. See David E. Rosenbaum, Democrats Set Change in Tone, Using Unit)' in Passing
Platform, N.Y. TIMES,June 27, 1988, at Al ,A14.
44. Black, supra note 16 (quoting Congressman William L. Clay).
45. Id.
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Brown's election as the first Black chair of the Democratic Party was
criticized because of his connections with the "Jackson wing" of the
46party.
In addition to the alienation of the Black electorate and poor at-
tempts by White leadership to build alliances with the Black leadership,
strategic alienation is meticulously exercised throughout the Democratic
Party's approach to the election game. An egregious example of this alien-
ation strategy is the steps the Party has made to change its primary
process. Professor Frymer explains that since the mid-1980s Democrats
have actively tried to end their losing streak by manipulating the out-
comes of the election earlier in the election year. For example, the
Democrats began to use "Super Tuesday" to test the appeal that a candi-
date might have to southern White voters. The Party holds several
southern state primaries on the same Tuesday, which generally results in a
conservative southern candidate emerging with a substantial lead. If not,
whoever is in the lead will at least influence other candidates to adopt
policies consistent with the interest of the southern voter.47 Blacks then
have no choice but to support the moderate candidate, as he would un-
doubtedly be the most favorable choice.48 As Frymer concludes, the Black
voters are forever in a quandary-they have little choice but to unite be-
hind a party that is self-consciously designed to appeal to White swing-
49
voters.
Interestingly, this compromising of Black interests is in no way new
to the representative party's modus operandi. It is as old as Black franchise
itself. For example, the Reconstruction Radical Republicans compro-
mised over the wording of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
while limiting Black voting power due to northern and southern Whites
opposition to the Black franchise."' Their actions with respect to the
White voter foretold the conduct of "Black" parties to come: "For the
sake of national reconciliation among whites, they retreated at the con-
gressional, executive, and judicial levels from the Reconstruction
Amendments' promise of an end to racial discrimination.' ' This trend
persists even today. As late as the early 1990s, Lani Guinier reminds us
that:
46. See Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 415.
47. Frymer, supra note 10, at 73.
48. Id. at 64. Frymer explains that although Black voters oppose many components of
the Democratic Party platform, they endorse it because it is better, for the most part, than
the Republican Party platform.
49. Id.
50. Specifically, the compromise allowed the states to retain control over who was
qualified to vote. The Republican moderates "deployed short-lived black voting power to
establish the terms for readmission of the Southern states to the Union." Blacksher, supra
note 30, at 729.
51. Id.
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Democrats, who control both houses of Congress, seem un-
aware that reciprocity in bargaining requires the active
promotion of black interests, not just the occasional subven-
tion and authorization of civil rights enforcement. In other
words, black legislative issues can be ghettoized from the
Left as well as the Right. 2
Though christened the first Black President by Toni Morrison s3 Bill
Clinton did not depart from this traditional manner of Democratic Party
play. In fact, President Clinton is noted for making it acceptable for a self-
defined Democrat to be unabashedly conservative in approach, effectively
blurring the line between the Right and the Left.54 The Clinton strategy
was dubbed a "third way," employing more circuitous paths to conserva-
tive ends.' Though his astronomic popularity with Black America rarely
wavered, Clinton went further Right to find additional votes for the 1994
Crime Bill.'6 His approach to affirmative action, "mend it, don't end it,"
was anemic.57 Further, on a more ideological level, though Clinton pub-
licly expressed regret for slavery, he "did not think the federal government
should pay reparations to slave descendants.""'
Black voices were also ignored during the 2000 election and were
later silenced in the post-election debacle" Once again, the candidates
were unwilling to allow race to become a focal point of the campaign. 
60
Both Bush and Gore focused their attention on the issues their strategists
deemed more important to voters at the center of the political spectrum.
Again, the lack of Black leaders intensified the absence of the true
52. Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 416.
53. Frymer, supra note 10, at 68.
54. See id.
55. Frymer, supra note 10, at 67.
56. Id. at 68.
57. Id.
58. Chris K. lijima, Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of Acquiescence: The
Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Hinniliation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385, 389
n. 13 (1998) (quoting President Clinton).
59. Though fascinatingly unprecedented in other areas, Frymer argues that on matters
of race, the 2000 election was unremarkable. Frymer, supra note 10, at 56.
60. Frymer argues that the elision of race is, in fact, more pervasive than it appears on
its face:
Even in the most civil of elections (such as 2000), national political dis-
course is merely racially generic-the parties focus on narrow sets of
issues that are believed to be without any racial content.... [lI]n practice it
amounts to discourse that is quite race-specific, as it focuses on issues that
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political voice the'Black voter demands."' For example, in a frustrating
censorship of Black outrage, the Gore campaign "quietly asked" Jesse
Jackson and Al Sharpton to mute their attempts to rally protest against
suspected voting rights violations in Florida.62 Thus, the Black voter or
candidate has dwindling influence in the party they continue to support.
This centuries-old pandering continues to marginalize Black inter-
ests, and it shows no signs of stopping. In the name of a false notion of
racial harmony-harmony being equated with the absence of Black in-
terests-intelligent and complicated debates on policy issues give way to
what are essentially White interests. Frymer explains, "[I]n the current
context, [the pandering to swing voters] has resulted in a defensive poli-
tics: Democrats appeal to African American issues at the base level
calculated to keep blacks in the party.'' 3
B. Our Resilient Loyalties: Tie Brief Tale of Gary Franks and the CBC
The most telling demonstration of the Black community's unflinch-
ing support of the Democratic Party is its treatment of "defectors." Black
Republicans are often treated as pariahs in the Black political community.
Although the prevalence of this (still quite small) political identity is in-
creasing, there remains a general discomfort with those who identify with
the party whose position, or lack thereof, on Black policy issues is gener-
ally deemed odious. Sometimes referred to as an "Uncle Tom,' 6 4 the Black
Republican is most benignly known as a "race-traitor."
Occasionally, the presence of even one Black conservative proves
troublesome. The Congressional Black Caucus was forced to come to
terms with its own "prejudices" when faced with conservative Republi-
61. We are further limited in raising our own voice with the Democratic Party by the
inability of Black leaders to make strides in their own political careers. This inability is also
attributable to Party politics; the Democratic Party for fear of ultimate loss in November
thwarts a search for formidable Black leaders. See id. at 60.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 59-60. Frymer presents the Hobson's Choice by adding, "Republicans ad-
dress racial issues with only enough care not to frighten white voters with unattractive
racism." Id. at 60.
64. In an editorial, Jack Sims, mayor of District Heights, Maryland, and President of
the Maryland Black Mayors, takes another official to task for his comments about a Black
Republican. Sims queries:
Michael Steele is a Prince Georgian, an American and a Republican, and
he has an African American heritage. In your statement to the Gazette on
September 28, you refer to him as an "Uncle Toni." Mr. President, does
your comment mean that all African American Republicans are "Uncle
Toms"? If we start calling each other names, then what's next? The "n"
word?
Jack Sims, No More Name-Calhng, Please .... WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 2001, at T04.
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can Gary Franks' membership. Franks, a Black man, was elected by Con-
necticut's ninety percent White fifth district and is the most conservative
of the three Republican delegates from the New England state." Due to
personal, ideological and political differences, the CBC considered ousting
Franks, though membership is only contingent upon his status as a Black
congressman. More than the Congressman being a loyal, toeing-the-
party-line Republican, the Democrats charged that Franks held "histori-
cally blasphemous and racially traitorous views on civil rights. '6 Franks,
for example, opposed the creation of majority-minority congressional
districts under the 1965 Voting Rights Act-districts from which all of
the new southern CBC members were elected in 1992 .
In spite of clear differences between Franks and the rest of the mem-
bership, official bipartisanship, as painful as it may be, would prevail in the
end.Then CBC Chairman, Representative Kweisi Mfume (D-MD), asked
rhetorically, "[c]an the Congressional Black Caucus accommodate diver-
sity and plurality?" Mfume's lucid response was that "It must. And as long
as I am chair it will."8 As discussed below, the changing political tide
makes it especially important for African-Americans not to succumb to
internal dissension.
C. Interethnic Competition: Dealing with the Decreasing Piece of the Pie
If significant power within the Democratic Party ever existed for
Blacks, that power is being challenged by the changing demographics of
the nation. The close of the last century witnessed an increase in immi-
grant persons of color who are decisively altering the political landscape.
That increase is only going to grow more consequential as political parties
continue to respond to the change in the electorate. Once the most co-
herent and sizeable racial minority in the United States, Blacks will now
have to "compete" with the political needs of newer citizens. Their voice
will increasingly become only one in a loud chorus.
With the growth of "ethnic minority" groups, especially Latinos,
Asians and Pacific Islanders, as well as Blacks, Walter Farrell, Jr. and James
Johnson predict, among other things, growing tensions between these
groups vying for political power." Already, the 2000 census indicates that




68. Id. To that end, Mfume devised a solution that allowed the CBC Democratic
Caucus to hold private meetings, debating and voting on various policies. The full Caucus
including Franks would then debate its decisions again. Id.
69. See generally Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Minority Political Participation
in the Neuw Milleniin: The New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act, 79. N.C. L. REV. 1215
(2001). Farrell and Johnson argue that conflicts loom in the 21st century political horizon,
SPRING. 2003]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law[
political power is shifting in the South and West, where twelve congres-
sional seats have been added, due to population resulting from the
increase in the number of immigrants from countries south and west of
the United States .
Currently, in the 107th Congress, Blacks occupy 39 Representative
71and Delegate seats, constituting the largest of-color group representation .
Latinos follow with fourteen seats, Asians and Pacific Islanders, eight seats.
This composition, however, will undoubtedly change. By the middle of
this century, the United States is projected to be a racially pluralistic soci-
ety, with no one racial group holding a majority in the population. By
2050 the U.S. population is expected to reach 400 million, a 50.2% in-
crease from 1992. Eighty-two million members of the population,
accounting for twenty-one percent, will be immigrants and their children
who arrived after 1991. By then, the Black population will almost double
from its current size to sixty-two million . At the same time, the Latino
population, for example, is expected to jump from thirty-four million to
eighty-one million.
73
The worst-case scenario for Blacks, which is not unlikely, is even
greater political isolation. This is due in part to the fact that many immi-
grants adopt the prejudices against the Black community that are,
arguably, part and parcel of citizenship in American society. Farrell and
Johnson note that interethnic intolerance, poignantly illustrated by the
Los Angeles riots (discussed in greater detail infra)'7 is made worse by the
fact that "newly arrived immigrants often bring with them negative per-
ceptions, stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes toward America's racial
minority groups., ,7  Blacks are viewed negatively with regard to intelli-
and in order for minority groups to advance their political interests they must collaborate.
They insist, "[Mlinorities of all racial and ethnic hues must make a conscious effort to
reduce inter-group competition by embracing each others concerns and devising collabo-
rative strategies to facilitate progress across groups." Id. at 1242. The conflict arising out of
competition for political power is only one of three challenges they associate with the
actual and projected increase in groups of color. The other two are the establishment of
majority-minority districts and the factors and/or initiatives that work to reduce voter
participation among these groups. Id.
70. Id. at 1225. These countries are Mexico and those in Central America and the
Pacific Rim.
71. Id. at 1227. Thirty-eight of the Representatives are Democrats and members of
the Congressional Black Caucus; one is not.
72. Id. at 1218-19.
73. Id. Projections show that the largest increase will be in the Asian population. It is
projected to grow by 412% followed by: Latinos, 238%; Native Americans, 109%; Blacks,
94%; and Whites by 29%. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that only one out of every
four voting-age adults in predominantly Latino communities voted in the 2000 presiden-
tial election. Jamie Dettmer Future Hinges on Hispanic Vote, INSIGHT, Oct. 1, 2001, at 14.
Thus, the perceived "threat" may be exaggerated.
74. Farrell & Johnson, supra note 69, at 1224.
75. Id, at 1219.
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gence and welfare dependence.74 All things considered, as long as the
Black conmunity remains "the most rigidly segregated" of American of-
color groups," Blacks will literally have to go-it-alone.
The growing Latino population, in particular, complicates the politi-
cal arena for Blacks. Politically, Latinos are attracting incredible attention
due to their growing population and the concomitant increase in Latino
voter participation. Christopher Edley, Jr. observes, "[t]aking stock politi-
cally, one has to observe that the most important development afoot ... is
the burgeoning Latino population in California and in several Eastern
states ... [W]e seem to be on the verge of what could be a very impor-
tant political realignment."' The realignment might make it more difficult
for the Black voice to be heard, and the political consequences of that
disconnect will continue to occur in spite of--or perhaps because of-the
two groups' close proximity to each other, both physically and socio-
politically. Farrell and Johnson note that as Latinos increasingly move into
traditionally Black residential areas, the conflict over political representa-
tion between Latinos and Blacks will only become more contentious. 7 9 If
community conflicts are any measure, the political conflict will prove de-
structive to the Black community.
The Los Angeles riots, and the manner in which they were framed,
demonstrated how the political landscape might be refrained. A May 1992
editorial, written in Mexican-American newspaper La Presna (San Diego),
pontificated about the "true" subtext of the riots one month after the fact:
Though confronted with catastrophic destruction of the La-
tino businesses, which were 60% of the businesses destroyed,
major looting by Blacks and by the Central Americans liv-
ing in the immediate area and a substantial number of
Hispanics being killed, shot and/or injured, every major
television station was riveted to the concept that the unfold-
ing events could only be understood if viewed in the
context of the Black and White experiences. They missed
the crucial point: [t]he riots were not carried out against
76. A study asked one group to rate another more negatively on characteristics in-
cluding the following: intelligence, welfare dependence, being hard to get along with,
willingness to have intimate and prolonged social contact with the other racial and ethnic
minority groups. Id. at 1221.
77. Id. at 1222. Blacks are suffering, most acutely, from a systemic reality. For example,
"contemporary observations of racial residential segregation ... suggest that racial segrega-
tion in America is approaching apartheid proportions." Id.
78. EdleyJr., supra note 15, at 943.
79. The growth in Latino political activity is not mere conjecture. Tony Cardenas,
State Assemblyman from the San Fernando Valley, observes, "[tihe Latino community feels
more empowered by the population growth and more included, and they're voting in
greater numbers." Michael Janofsky, Death Puts Focus on Demographic Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2000 at 16.
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Blacks or Whites, they were carried out against the Latino
and Asian communities by the Blacks!
What occurred was a major racial confrontation by the
Black community, which now sees its numbers and influ-
ence waning.
Faced with nearly a million and a half Latinos taking over
the inner city, Blacks revolted, rioted and looted. Whatever
measure of power and influence they had pried loose from
the White power structure, they now see as being in danger
of being transferred to the Latino community. Not only are
they losing influence, public offices, and control of the ma-
jor civil rights mechanisms, they now see themselves as
being replaced in the pecking order by the Asian commu-
nity, in this case the Koreans.8'
Farrell and Johnson report, in contrast, that there was actually little
evidence of Blacks attacking Latino businesses during the riots. Further-
more, most of the people arrested for burning and looting were of
Hispanic background. However, the authors maintain, "these perceptions
and stereotypes have gravitas in the Hispanic community." Though clearly
not the disposition of all members of the Latino community, La Presna
introduced a way to frame the issues that are taking shape. Ronald
Brownstein notes that the "relentless Latino population growth" is "desta-
bilizing" old political accommodations between Blacks and Whites,
"creating a three-way struggle for influence."81
Nascent evidence of this power struggle has been most apparent in
mayoral races in major cities nationwide. " In Houston, the 2001 election
between the incumbent Black Democrat and a Latino Republican pitted
the two groups against one another.A In Los Angeles the unification of
Black leaders with James Hahn, a white moderate Democrat, facilitated an
unusual coalition in which eighty percent of the Black voters joined
White conservatives and liberals, allowing Hahn to defeat Hispanic candi-
date Antonio Villarogosa, the frontrunner during the race. Brownstein
contends that Hahn had an advantage with the Black community, not
80. Id. at 1223.
81. Ronald Brownstein, Latinos Are Stirring the Political Pot, NEWSDAY, Nov. 28, 2001, at
A41.
82. See id. (discussing the elections in Houston in 2001, New York in 2001, and Los
Angeles in 2000).
83. Id. Brownstein describes the races as "bitter competition." Here, Latino votes,
typically cast by Mexican-American Democrats, were willing to make a Cuban-American
Republican become Houston's first Latino mayor. See John Williams, Election 2001/Voter
Turnout a Boon for Sancliez/Strong GOP Hispanic Support Surpasses Pundits' Predictions, Hous.
CHRON., Nov. 8,2001, at 23.
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only because he has longtime family ties to the community, but partly
because Blacks feared that a Latino mayor would tip the local balance of
power out of their favor. ' In New York City,"' though there was greater
unity between the two groups during the primary elections, Farrell and
Johnson recount a conflict between prominent Black leader Al Sharpton,
and Latino candidate Fernando Ferrer. Ferrer rejected Sharpton's demand
for the candidate's endorsement of Black candidates for two specific city
offices. Sharpton offered his endorsement of the Latino candidate in ex-
change for the meeting of his demand. ' Though his offer was rejected,
Sharpton did support Ferrer, which helped him win seventy percent of
the Black vote in the Democratic primary against Mark Green. However,
the early coalition building that occurred collapsed on the November
election day, when almost half of the Latino vote went to Republican
candidate Mike Bloomberg."7
In the major mayoral races, ethnic conflicts (as they have been na-
tionally), are endemic to the Democratic Party, the chosen political party
for these two of-color groups. However, the outcome of the New York
mayoral race may portend seismic changes in political identification over
the next few decades. Chris Garcia, a political scientist at the University of
New Mexico, postulates, "Perhaps the mayoral races in Los Angeles and
NewYork are a harbinger of things to come.We may have the beginning
of Latinos becoming much more aware of group self-interest separate
from the Democratic Party.""" In response to frustrations with the De-
mocratic Party, Latinos are demonstrating, stridently, their unwillingness to
accept the failed promises of access and power. Unlike their Black coun-
terparts, Latinos view movement to the other party as a possibility in their
struggle for a political voice.
This shift has significant implications for Blacks, beyond the potential
gains for the adversarial party. And perhaps, there is something to be
learned. Rather than viewing them as a threat, African-Americans might
best view Latino voters as an emerging model.
84. Brownstein, supra note 81.
85. For more detailed discussion of this mayoral race, see infra Part III.B.
86. Farrell & Johnson, supra note 69, at 1245.
87. Brownstein, supra note 81. Interestingly, rather than viewing the New York City
mayoral race as a failure of "structural racism" endemic to the Democratic Party, Myriam
Marquez, referencing the Puerto Rican community, wrote, "They've left behind the divi-
sive racial politics of New York, where Hispanic voters this month were so turned off by
black/Hispanic tensions that huge numbers of Latino Democrats bolted to the GOP's
candidate." Myriam Marquez, Politically Speaking, Where is the Hispanic Comnmunity?, OR-
LANO SENTINEL, Nov. 27, 2001, at A15. Here Marquez frames the Latino "defection" as a
consequence of an interracial power struggle amongst the two largest of-color groups.
88. Liasson, supra note 29.
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III. EMERGING POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND ACTIVISM
IN THE LATINO COMMUNITY
A. The Growing Population and the Influence of
Demographic Shifts on the Political Tide
The 2000 census affirmed growing suspicions that Blacks were no
longer the largest of-color group in the United States. Latinos have ex-
perienced the most profound demographic changes over the last few
decades, recently surpassing Blacks in sheer numbers. '0 In California, for
example, as of 1976 the White American population was seventy-eight
percent, dwarfing the numbers of any of-color group.9' The Latino popu-
lation, along with Asian Americans, however, contributed to eighty-nine
percent of California's large population growth over the last twenty-five
9,years. In Los Angeles, alone, the Latino population is forty-seven percent,
again larger than any other of-color group. L.A.'s east coast counterpart,
New York, has a twenty-seven percent Latino population, almost equal to
the Black population. One commentator speculates that if current im-
migration trends continue in a similar fashion, the proportional
population of non-Hispanic whites will fall dramatically.94 This demo-
graphic change has certainly reverberated politically.
The Latino population is disparate in national origin, culture, and
socio-economic status. However, in spite of this intra-group diversity, La-
tinos have demonstrated a strong political bias in favor of the Democratic
Party.9 ' James Gimpel cited a Post/Kaiser/Harvard poll of 3800 Hispanic
respondents as a reliable measure of Latino political preferences by na-
tional origin."" According to Gimpel, the Democratic Party remains
89. James G. Gimpel, Q: Is the GOP Outreach to Latinos Likely to Succeed? (Symposiun),
INSIGHT, Oct. 15, 2001, at 40. See also Lynette Clemston,January 19-25: National; Hispanic
Power, N.Y. TIMES (NAT'L),Jan. 26, 2003, at 2.
90. Id.
91. Edley, supra note 15, at 950. This figure is from 1976.
92. Id.
93. Brownstein, supra note 81.
94. Gimpel, supra note 89, at 41.
95. Id. Gimpel asserts that despite coming from dozens of countries, each with their
own cultural traits and traditions, the Democratic Party line has historically been more
attractive.
96. Removing the Cuban population, the Democratic advantage ranges from a low of
21.5 points among Salvadorans to a high of 57.6 points among Dominicans. Among
Mexicans, the largest Latino group in the United States, the Democrats have a 22-point
edge over Republicans. The Democratic advantage is more formidable when one consid-
ers that the Republican advantage in the Cuban political community is only six points.
Gimpel's conclusory analysis of the poll data insists that the Democratic advantage is
strong regardless of economic standing. In fact, Latinos with "longer tenure" in the United
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attractive to most Latinos due to the total effect of its immigration policy,
healthcare, social welfare, and social programs."'
The consistent and growing support of the Democratic Party by La-
tinos might appear daunting to the Republican Party.9 Regardless,
Republicans view pursuit of the Latino vote as an imperative.The cost of
not pursuing this emerging demographic is a threat calling many Repub-
licans into uncharacteristic action." And, despite Gimpel's evidence of
unshakeable Democratic support, there are signs that the Latino vote may
be increasingly up for grabs.
In the past, the strength of the Latino vote has been in the Democ-
ratic camp for both presidential and congressional races.""' However,
Latinos are seeking greater political power "more urgently than ever;" and
in spite of strong efforts, there has been, as with other racial minorities,
difficulty "getting in the door.'""' With knowledge of their growing po-
litical power and the degree to which they might influence major
elections in the future, Latinos are self-consciously examining their strate-
gies for getting in the door. Acknowledging that Central Florida, for
example, will be at the "center" of presidential elections in the future,
Andres Gonzales, the Democratic National Committee's Latino Affairs
point man, remarked, "We realize that either party, to be dominant in the
future, must have the Latino vote."'' 2 This sentiment is not unique to
Gonzalez; this type of political self-consciousness is gaining greater com-
plexity and strength among the Latino political community, from leaders
to laypersons.
Writing in the mid-1990s, Executive Director of the Southwest
Registration Project, Ricardo Martinez, offers a comprehensive present
and future view of the Latino participation in the political landscape.
For Martinez, Latino power in the U.S. political market can only occur
once all Latinos realize their size and strength and act on that using their
States and "greater educational attainment" increasingly vote in favor of the Democratic
Party. Id.
97. Id. at 43.
98. See generally Dettmer, supra note 73. Dettmer makes observations similar to those
of Gimpel. She also states that the once healthy advantage among Cuban Americans has
diminished to "a meager 6%." She adds, "More alarming for Republicans is that, unlike a
lot of European minority groups in the past, Latinos appear to identify just as much with
Democrats the more educated they are or, if they're immigrants, the longer they've lived in
the United States." Id. at 14.
99. See infra Part llI.C n.138 and accompanying text.
100. Yet, importantly, that strength is dulled by the relatively low rates of voter registra-
tion and election day turnout as compared to Black and White voters. Dettmer, supra note
74, at 14.
101. See Brownstein, supra note 81.
102. Quoted in Marquez, supra note 87, at A15.
103. See Ricardo Martinez, Motivation of Latino Voters for Political Einpowerniet, 14 Ciii-
cANo-LAilNo L. REV. 103 (1994).
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own voice. He argues "We began to organize our vote-not to support
presidential candidates, gubernatorial candidates, the Democratic Party, or
the Republican Party-because none of the aforementioned wanted to
see the Latino vote grow to any extent." 104 He makes the further point
that the dramatic increases in voter registration among Latinos nationwide
were achieved, solely, by the efforts of Latinos in the courts and in the
community. The Democratic Party and the Republican Party, during this
period of growth, were of no help. '5
Latino politics is notable, first and foremost, by its growing power
that since the mid-1990s is foolish to ignore. As the Latino political com-
munity becomes increasingly self-aware, its allegiances become even more
devoutly based in the community, to the exclusion of a particular national
party. Martinez insists "[t]he 'sleeping giant' must be addressed, not by
Democrats, the courts, or the legislature, but by our community., 0 6 De-
terminations must be made as to whether or not a "leader" or
"representative" deserves community support. Such support needs to be
earned and, more importantly, vigilantly maintained.
B. Threats of Flight: The Increasingly Tenuous Relationship
Between Latinos and the Democratic Party
Though the story is not specific to the City of NewYork, the 2001
Mayoral election is a poignant allegory for the growing tensions between
Latino voters and a Party that pathologically takes its voters and leaders
of-color for granted. Described as one of New York City's largest, most
loyal of-color groups, Latinos usually give Democrats roughly seventy-five
percent of their vote.'17 However, Latino leaders are pushing the Democ-
ratic Party to consider a new political landscape. Bronx Democratic Party
leader Roberto Ramirez insists that it is obvious that the party must do
some "soul-searching" and affirmatively work to woo alienated voters of
color in New York. 'Os The message is clear: The Latino community is not
104. Id. at 104.
105. Id. According to Martinez, between 1976-88, Latino voter registration grew by
83%. The numbers were as follows: California-95.6%, Colorado-91%, Arizona-65%,
New Mexico-52%. Voter turnout in five western states increased by a total of 61%.The
numbers: California-28.9%, Colorado-88%, Arizona--64%, New Mexico-59%,
Texas-114%. Id.
106. Id. at 1.06.
107. Liasson, supra note 29. See also Juan Andrade, Latinos Taugqht N'ew York Pol a Lesson;
Moral of the Story: Don't Disrespect Hispanics and Expect to Win, CHI. SUN-TMES, Nov. 18,
2001, at 38. Andrade writes that no one could envision Green's loss when Democrats,
generally outnumber Republicans five to one.
108. Ron Howell, et al., Election 2001, Latino Vote No Longer a Lock, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8,
2001, at A6. Howell asks, "How does [the Democratic Party] come to accept the basic
notion that there is a new political landscape in NewYork?" Id.
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convinced that the Democratic Party has done enough to deserve the
community's support.
Since 1989, the Latino vote for Democratic candidates has been
gradually slipping, tracking waning faith in the Party. '  With a question
that might have seemed near political blasphemy just years ago, one
Puerto Rican voter, Juan Jose Rosario, demonstrated this waning faith in
the Party by asking,"What are the Democrats doing for us?'"" Democrats
apparently have not created a sufficient amount of political empowerment
for Latinos to gain credibility and a substantive connection with the
community.' The Party, generally, and Mark Green, specifically, has spo-
ken out of both sides of their mouth. Reporter Harry Kresky, using a
Mark Green gambit as an illustration, demonstrates the hypocrisy of
"party-speak":
In a 1999 letter to the Justice Department claiming that a
shift to non-partisan elections would violate the Voting
Rights Act, Green contended that because most blacks are
Democrats, they can exercise more influence in a Democ-
ratic primary then in a nonpartisan election where their
voting strength would be diluted by white Republicans and
independents. He argued that the only shot a black or La-
tino mayoral candidate would have is through the
Democratic Party. But when a legitimate candidate arose to
carry that mantle, Green did what he could to knock him
down."
2
As was evidenced by the 2001 mayoral election, the Latino community
has held the Democratic Party accountable. In that election, a vital num-
ber of Latinos voted against Democratic candidate Mark Green or stayed
at home.'
In light of NewYork City mayoral history, the presence of racism in
the 2001 election is not exceptional. When considering the five-to-one
edge'"4 Democrats have over Republicans, New York becomes notable for
its lack of Black or Brown representation over the years.i s The city has
109. Mirta Ojito, City's Hispanic Shift, Moving Toward G.O.P, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001,
at D5.
110. Marquez, supra note 87.
111. Id.
112. Kresky, supra note 33.
113. See Ojito, supra note 109.
114. Andrade, supra note 107. See also Kresky, supra note 33.
115. New York seems to be peculiar in its absence of of-color mayors throughout its
history. "By contrast, according to the National League of Cities, in 1997 there were 40
Black mayors of cities with populations of 50,000 or more, and 29 of those cities elected
their mayors through nonpartisan elections." See Kresky, supra note 33.
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only had one Black mayor-one-term Mayor David Dinkins''-and no
Latino mayors. The 2001 mayoral election was overtly riddled with race
politics, from the Democratic Party primary to the November election
day. Fueling the arrogance that would later lead to his undoing was
Green's inability to envision losing a significant number of the of-color
votes in a city that favors Democrats so heavily.Yet, his tactics were so in-
sidious that his use of race could do nothing but alienate some of the
Party's most loyal supporters.117
November 6, 2001 produced a surprising loss for Democrats in New
York City. In what one commentator has described as a powerful blow for
respect and political independence,"" 100,000 Latinos voted for "Repub-
lican-lite""9 Michael Bloomberg. Forty-one percent of the Latino voters
that voted for Democrat Ferrer in the primary switched to Bloomberg
the day it mattered most for Democrats.' -" Bloomberg would win this
race by 45,000 votes.121
The loss occurred in the wake of the Democratic Party's fragnienta-
tion and increasing evidence of Latino disenchantment. Ferrer opined that
the Latino "switch" was a necessary outcome because the Democratic
116. According to Kresky, Dinkins lost his bid for a second term when tens of thou-
sands of White Democrats "deserted" him to vote for Republican candidate Rudolph
Giuliani. In sum, Kresky finds politics in New York City, generally, and this election, spe-
cifically, noteworthy because of its demonstration of the "structural racism" of the
Democratic Party. Id.
117. Green ran a particularly divisive campaign, beginning with his race against Fer-
nando Ferrer. The last day before the primary election, Green ran a television ad against
Ferrer asking, "Can we afford to take the chance?" Id. Further, voters in predominantly
white areas received telephone calls warning voters that a vote for Ferrer was a vote for Al
Sharpton. Such action worked as an indicator of the potential power and participation
Latino leaders would enjoy within a Green administration. With such clear exclusion of
Latinos in his electoral coalition, exclusions from his governing coalition would logically
follow. As a consequence, while exit polling indicated almost seventy-five percent of Black
voters voted for Green, the Latino vote nearly split in half. Id. See also Ojito, supra note
109.
118. Andrade, supra note 107.
119. Bloomberg was a Democratic Party member just prior to his decision to run for
mayor. Adam Nagourney, Conquered Party Bitterly Divided Across the City, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
8, 2001, at Al. Nagourney notes that Mr. Bloomberg was, in fact, a lifelong Democrat. Id.
A shift in party affiliation by the Latino political community might not be as notable,
ideologically speaking, when one considers that, not only was Bloomberg a Republican
newborn, but also that New York City Republicans tend to be farther left than their
counterparts nationwide. In other words, Republicans from a major city in the Northeast
tend to be far more palatable than many, perhaps most, other Republican leaders. Tellingly,
while Bloomberg's capturing of forty-seven percent of the Latino vote is noteworthy his
yield was only four points higher than Mayor Guiliani in his 1997, second term election.
Ojito, supra note 109.
120. Siegel, supra note 32.
121. Andrade, supra note 107.
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Party "fails to understand its core constituencies." 22 Bronx Assemblyman
and Democrat Jose Rivera did not campaign for Green on Election
Day. 23 He explained, "I took the day off. Mark Green's people thought
they could prove they could win without the Latino vote. They gave it
their best shot, and they failed.' 2 4 The overt use of race, on one hand, and
its elision, 25 on the other, was considered just desserts2 1 for the some-
times-principled Democrat.'2 7 However, Green is merely one example of
a systemic problem of the Democratic Party.'2'
Interestingly, while Black voters remained loyal, Latinos sparked a
crisis. Angelo Falcon, Senior Policy Executive with the Puerto Rican
122. Siegel, suipra note 32. Elsewhere, Ferrer was quoted saying, "I think we ought to
understand what happened yesterday, the Democratic Party had been used to for a long
time taking a lot of people for granted. They bolted, notwithstanding the recomnenda-
tions of people like me or other people." Nagourney, supra note 119.
123. Rivera was not alone in his boycott of traditional Party-wide election day cam-
paigning. Howell and Taylor described "bitter" Black and Latino Democratic leaders sitting
out the day of the campaign and enjoying their own party in the Bronx that evening.They
wrote, "lelven Bill Lynch, the respected Democratic loyalist and strategist who guided
former Mayor David Dinkins to victory more than a decade ago, did not campaign for
Green. '1 am going to get a haircut,' Lynch said yesterday afternoon." Ron Howell & Cur-
tis Taylor, l)emocrats'Task: Pull Party Together, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 2001, at A7.
124. Id.
125. By this I mean that there was a profound, and consequential, disconnect between
Green and his sizeable of-color constituency Green did not sufficiently consider the ef-
fects of his willful disregard of the Latino community. Angelo Falcon remarked, "The way
[Green] was able to basically use the race card showed how disconnected he was from the
Black and Latino base of the Democratic Party." Id.
126. According to Andrade, the Latino vote for Bloomberg was not as much a vote for
the Republican ticket as it was a vote against Green, "whose arrogance and racist tactics
were too much for Latinos." He explains further:
Green made the biggest mistake of his political life by assuming that La-
tino votes were incorrigible Democrats who would invariably vote
overwhelmingly for the Democratic nominee .... Green believed incor-
rectly that Latino voters would just overlook or forget about whatever he
said or did to Ferrer in the heat of a campaign, because the alternative
would mean electing a Republican mayor.
Andrade, supra note 107.
127. Representative Major Owens (D-Brooklyn) remarked, "Mark should have learned
a lesson from this.... I think he is a person of high principles but . . . sometimes he doesn't
put enough value on his relations with the people on the bottom." Howell & Taylor, supra
note 123.
128. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 32 ("The race was a microcosm of the struggle faced by
national Democratic leaders, who are trying to balance various interest and ethnic
groups."). Using a disturbingly accurate analogy, Dennis Rivera, head of the healthcare
workers union and Ferrer supporter, said in reference to the Party's treatment of minority
voters in this campaign: "It's almost a battered woman syndrome-no it doesn't matter
what I do to you, you have to be with me." Nagourney, supra note 119. Democrats have
now lost the last three elections. That fact, according to Rivera, is "basically an indictment
of the Democratic Party." Id.
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Legal Defense and Education Fund, declared the end of a politically abu-
sive relationship: "It should shake the Democratic party to its foundation.
For too long, the Democrats have taken the Latino vote for granted. They
have insulted us. They have ignored us, and still we voted for them. No
,,i29
more.
This declaration of independence is loud and determined.1
3
0
Declarations have ranged from admonition to clear threats.13' The message
sent to "big-city Democrats," according to Brownstein, is that they can
"either make more room in city government for Latinos or turn over the
keys to the GOP'1 32 Finally, emphasizing the vital importance of the
Latino vote, Juan Andrade, author and President of the U.S. Hispanic
Leadership Institute, emphatically declared, "Candidates who try to win in
a city with a substantial Latino population without including Latinos in
their electoral coalition can forget about involving us in their governing




Andrade's insistence on the strength of the Latino vote is clear. While
many Latino voters cannot stomach voting for a Republican candidate, 
134
many Latinos chose to support Bloomberg, who by most accounts is not
"perfect," but did not play the race card. 13 Instead of noting the number
of White Democrats that have chosen to crossover and vote for the Re-
publican candidate, Andrade contends that New York City had two
consecutive Republican mayors for the first time in its history in large
part due to Latino "defection. 1 36 He writes that Bloomberg follows Guil-
iani "thanks to an unrepentant, arrogant Democrat and a newly
129. Id.
130. Hints of similar dissent among Blacks have come from purported Black leader Al
Sharpton. Sharpton insisted, "I refused to help Green, and by anyone's estimation it hurt
him, but there's nothing the party can do to me. What can they do to me?" Nagourney,
supra note 119.The Democratic Party did complain about the havoc Sharpton was wreak-
ing. Howell, supra note 108. Sharpton's estimation over the impact he made on voter
choices may be slightly overstated, however. The Black community still overwhelmingly
supported Green on election day. Broinstein, supra note 81.
131. Anthony Miranda, President of the 10,000 member Latino Officers Association of
NewYork City, encourages "the Hispanic community and the community at large ... not
to fall into the old politics of falling into one party versus another party." Across the Na-
tio--Latino Group Switches to Bloomiberg, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at A8.
132. Brownstein, supra note 81.
133. Andrade, supra note 107. Andrade also warns that "Democrats who think they can
continue to offend the Latino community, disrespect our leaders or deny us representation,
don't deserve Latino support and shouldn't get it ... we don't have to tolerate them any-
more. And that should be good news for Republicans going into 2002." Id.
134. Howell and Taylor interviewed one woman whose antipathy towards Republicans
was particularly acute. South Bronx resident Ebony Veney, 24, said that she "categorically
refuses" to vote Republican. On election day she preferred not voting at all rather than
voting for Green, whom she believed was "two-faced." Howell & Taylor, supra note 123.
135. Kresky, supra note 33.
136. Andrade, supra note 107.
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invigorated Latino electorate."' 13' The Latino electorate is powerful
enough, if Andrade and similar commentators are correct, to change the
political tide, perhaps to change history.
C. Republican Prospects for the Future
If Democrats continue to act in the racially divisive ways that they
have demonstrated, Republicans may not have to play very many cards at
all in order to win the Latino vote.The Republican Party, however, is not
leaving this potentially powerful realignment to chance (or Democratic
Party failings, as the case may be). The Party is not only wooing the La-
tino electorate, by offering a willing ear, but also promising handsome
rewards for its leaders. 3 8 More fundamentally, however, some in the Re-
publican Party believe that the Latino electorate may find more than just
money and power on the Right. Ideologically, Republicans have
attempted to create ties, however sincere, with Latinos sometimes-
conservative political leanings. In an assessment of the burgeoning politi-
cal landscape, Republican National Committee Chairman Jim Gilmore
opined:
I certainly think that the Democrats have not consolidated
the Hispanic community as part of their coalition, and these
races, of course, continue to demonstrate that. But we're not
worried about what the Democrats are or are not doing.
We're focusing on being for the Hispanic community and
offering the common values and goals that we believe that
we all share of entrepreneurship and independence and strong
family values. This is the essence of the Hispanic community,
and we think they're natural Republican voters.139
Gilmore's convictions are belied by the relationship that the Repub-
lican leadership has fostered with its constituents. Only eight years ago,
the Republican platform in California was marked by its nativist approach
to new policy. Pete Wilson crafted his re-election campaign for governor
around proposals to deny state benefits to illegal immigrants-a proposal
that would be realized by the passage of Proposition 187.14" However, less
137. Id.
138. Marquez tells the story of Democrat Tony Suarez who ran for a state House seat
in a majority Republican district in 1999. The state Leadership "resisted spending a penny
until the very end." Marquez concludes, "Suarez won that election in spite of the party."
Marquez, supra note 87.
139. Liasson, supra note 29.
140. See Dettmer, supra note 73, at 39. At that time, Wilson, without fear of electoral
repercussions, broadcasted ads showing Mexicans crossing the southwest border of Cali-
fornia with a voice-over warning, "they just keep coming." Id. Dettmer believes that
California sums up the challenge for the GOP, with its prior association with "several
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than a decade later, George W Bush, who now leads the Republican Party,
sought legislation allowing more Mexicans to live and work in the
United States legally.
There is ample evidence of Republican efforts to woo Latino voters.
President George W Bush has been the most vigilant politician to pursue
this voting demographic. The President's Senior Political Adviser, Karl
Rove, has told reporters of the President's "mission" and "goal"1 41 of woo-
ing the Latino population, requiring all Republicans, "in every way and
every day working to get that done.'"' To that end Bush has forged a
strong relationship with Mexican President Vicente Fox, the only signifi-
cant foreign-policy relationship forged prior to September 11th. ' 43 Bush
also made the controversial decision to halt military practice bombings in
Vieques, Puerto Rico.14 Further, prior to the September 11th attacks,
Bush was shopping the proposal to "regularize" the status of millions of
undocumented Mexican immigrants. Other affirmative efforts include a
festival held on the South Lawn in celebration of Cinco de Mayo,14 ex-
pansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement,1 4 ' and the
tailoring of Cabinet picks and controversial policy decisions. 4
'anti-immigrant policies' that strike at their pride." Id. According to Peter Schrag, Latinos
are the key to the GOP's future in California. They have represented "virtually all" of the
increase in the state's electorate over the last decade. Peter Schrag, A GOP Resurgence in
California?, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Oct. 20, 2001, at B8.
141. Dettmer, supra note 73.
142. Id.
143. Gimpel, supra note 89. Bush's first foreign trip was to President Fox's ranch. See
Mimi Hall, New hite House, New 'War Room' for Strategizing, USA ToDAY,July 5, 2001, at
A4. Hall also noted that Fox made two visits the White House, the second, as a guest of
honor at President Bush's first state dinner. Id. Dettmer notes that Bush's motivations are
no mystery. The motivation was clear in his decision to make Mexico his "first foreign
port of call after inauguration ... snubbing a more traditional European venue or Canada."
Dettmer, supra note 73. In less than eight months Bush met with Fox five times. Id.
144. Dettmer, supra note 73, at 14.
145. Schrag, supra note 140.
146. Cinco de Mayo is the May 5th holiday celebrating a Mexican victory over French
invaders. In addition to the festival, the President delivered his weekly address that day in
English and Spanish. Hall, supra note 143. The weekly Republican radio message is now
being broadcasted in Spanish as well. Gimpel, supra note 89.
147. Polls indicated that there was a seventy-five percent approval rating for this expan-
sion. Dettmer, supra note 73, at 39.
148. Ginpel notes, "While publicly [Republican Party Chairman Jim Gilmore] op-
poses quotas based on race or ethnicity in filling federal-government patronage jobs, the
Bush administration has set a recruitment goal of at least 10 percent Hispanics." Gimpel,
supra note 89, at 41. Dettmer remarks that Bush aides have primarily focused on "attract-
ing wealthy and educated Latinos by appointing a handful of well-heeled Hispanics to
government posts." Dettmer, supra note 73, at 14-15.
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There are some detractors in this Party shift;", however, the effort to
participate in the struggle over voters that will respond to enticement,
genuine or otherwise, is clear. Whether or not such recruitment efforts
will truly be to the benefit of Republicans, s'' the advantages that Latinos
will gain is a more willing ear in positions of power.
IV THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AS AN ALTERNATIVE
FOR AFRICAN-AMERICANS
A. Status and Possibilities
The Black voting community has largely remained outside of the
Republican Party because of the great divergence in political priorities
both groups possess. For the Black community, "civil rights" has histori-
cally been the primary interest. In fact, it is the space from which more
sophisticated voting rights measures have emerged. Recently, however,
economic justice has competed for top billing amongst Blacks, providing
a potential window of opportunity for Republican expansion.
According to a 2001 National Urban League poll of African-
Americans, economic issues tied racial discrimination at number one on a
list of community concerns.' Columnist for USA Today, DeWayne
Wickham speculates that "[t]his may be just the opening Republicans
need. African Americans, by a wide margin, believe that 'economic op-
portunity,' not 'political leadership,' should be the primary focus of major
black organizations.""52 Sixty percent of the respondents polled said that
they want Black leaders to focus on economic empowerment, while po-
litical leadership was of primary concern to only twenty-four percent of
respondents." 3 Economic empowerment is linked more frequently, as the
149. Dettrner quotes a Senior GOP Senator, "I worry that we will be seen as pander-
ing for purely electoral reasons. Take the Vieques decision-the Navy really needs that
range and we did a disservice to the military. And take inirrigration-I'm not sure our
own grassroots approved of the amnesty idea at all." And reporting a more sophisticated
analysis by the Senator, Dettner writes, "The senator also points to another worry skeptics
of the Bush approach frequently mention: that the White House fails to discriminate be-
tween the nationality groups within the Latino vote and fails in the sophisticated
understanding of what appeals to the different groups. 'Latino voters cannot simply be
pushed into a single category,' he says." l)ettmer, supra note 73, at 39.
150. As noted above, only one-fourth of the voting-age adults in predominantly Latino
neighborhoods voted in the 2000 election. Id.
151. DeWayne Wickham, Economic Issues Loom Larce for Blacks aid GOP, USA TODAY,
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poll suggests, with the still "overriding" concern among Blacks about civil
rights. 
15 4
Urban League president, Hugh Price, commented on the survey say-
ing, "Basically the message is, if you want to get the attention of black
people, deal with their concerns about their economic well-being and get
serious about closing the economic gap that separates African Americans
from whites.""' This indicates that the Republican Party, known for their
unflinching commitment to economic prosperity, may have an important
ideological connection with a sizeable majority of the Black community.
Further, other areas of the Republican platform have become more at-
tractive to Blacks. Faith-based initiatives, for example, are supported by
fifty percent of the polled respondents, while only thirty-two percent op-
posed them.
16
The changing political priorities of the Black community should be
of great advantage to the Republicans.The emphasis on economic oppor-
tunity and the "deep roots religion" in the Black community might
indicate that Republicans can woo Black voters without first changing
their position on civil rights."7 Wickham notes that news of the poll will
undoubtedly produce a "ripple of excitement in the White House and the
Republican caverns on Capitol Hill, where conventional right-wing
dogma holds that black leaders are out of step with the African American
masses.'58
However, by most accounts the optimism should be tempered. As
Wickham also argues, it will not be easy for Republicans to convincingly
distance themselves from racial discrimination. For example, major pro-
grammatic concerns for Blacks still contradict distinctly Republican
tenets. Eighty-seven percent of African-American respondents believe that
there is still a need for affirmative-action programs in higher education
and places of employment. ' 9 Though George W. Bush has engaged in
154. Civil rights were "a relevant and meaningful concern" for eighty-seven percent of
the respondents. Eighty-three percent rated race relations as either "only fair" or "poor.-
Id.
155. Id. Further, Price does not believe that the Black Community's concerns about




159. Id. Wickham cautions,
[T]he bad news for Republicans is that most African Americans believe
that affirmative action is a way of overcoming the discrimination that has
clustered many of them at the bottom of this nation's ladder of opportu-
nity-and as a means of leveling an economic playing field that has been
warped by past and current acts of racial bigotry.
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several discrete instances of affirmative action,' he and his Party have yet
to ingratiate themselves with most of the African-American electorate on
this issue.'"' His presidential approval rating among African-American re-
spondents, according to this pre-September 11 th poll, was at a paltry 16%."-2
B. Their Likelihood of Success
Black people have survived 400 years qf slavery ... I think we can
survive four more years of Republicans. 16,
The prevailing perceptions of the Republican Party have such a long
and deep historical root that envisioning a movement toward the political
Right seems wistful, at best. For one politically active African-American
man, quoted above, Republican presidencies can be equated with long
and sustained periods of oppression; and, as suggested by Lani Guinier,
this perception may not differ too sharply from the Black community at
large.'"4 Although Guinier is describing the racial and political climate of
the late 1980's and early 1990's, the activity of Republican administrations
from Nixon to the second Bush attest to the repressive qualities of the
Republican Party and its members with respect to Blacks. "The modern
day GOP," according to columnist Cynthia Tucker, "has surrounded itself





160. Though he would never describe it as such, his pre- and post-election activity
provides evidence to support that assertion. During Bush's campaign and televised debates,
the candidate "maintained commitment" to civil rights, while avoiding previous Republi-
can race-baiting tactics, according to Paul Frymer. See Frymer, supra note 10, at 56. Black,
as well as Latino and Asian-American, faces were prominent throughout the campaign
and, especially, the Republican National Convention. In addition, Bush has nominated
several people of color to cabinet posts, including the first Black Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, and National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice. Id.
161. Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Affirmative Action: Constitutional Questions; President Faults
Race Preferences as Adnissions Tools, N.Y TIMES,Jan. 16, 2003, at Al.
162. Wickham, supra note 151.
163. Dirk Johnson,Jackson Addresses Convention of PUSH, N.Y TIMESJune 28, 1988, at
A2. These are the remarks of a Black organizer during the 1988 presidential race between
George H. Bush and Michael Dukakis. Guinier writes, "Echoing the views of many oth-
ers, Mr. Walker [self-described as a 'nameless, faceless black person'] said he found the
differences between Mr. Dukakis and Mr. Bush to be not so great." Guinier, Keeping the
Faith, supra note 12, at 414 n.92.The Republican Party is deemed as far more odious, such
that its 'reign' can be equated with slavery. Id.
164. Id.
165. Cynthia Tucker, Shunning Racis,, qf GOP, ATLANTA J. & CONST , Apr. 29, 1992, at
A15. Tucker uses a current case in South Carolina to illustrate her point. There, a Republi-
can consultant, Rod Shealy, hired a Black man facing felony charges to run for office
"hoping that the appearance of an unattractive black candidate would spur a huge white
voter turnout." Id. This is not an isolated incident,Tucker insists; as she sees it the incident
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In the 1960s, Richard Nixon based his campaign around wooing
two voting groups into his camp. One group was the "silent majority,"
comprised of voters that were not protesting, that were not breaking laws,
were employed, and had families and home mortgages."" The other was
Southerners.The "southern strategy" was defined by its attempts to woo a
group of voters who were opposed to school integration efforts and fa-
vored states rights."' Republican candidates have not abandoned Nixon's
basic roadmap. In fact, Reagan appealed to these same groups during his
winning bid for the presidency, with special emphasis placed on southern
whites and working class northern whites, dubbed the "Reagan Democ-
r a t s .
, ,
1 6 1
In the 1980s, Reagan's approach was particularly divisive with re-
spect to racial issues. His administration is marked by what can be read as
nothing less than blatant hostility toward Black and Latino communities
throughout America. His purpose, or at the very least the glaring effect,
was to polarize the electorate.'"' Reagan's administration notoriously
stripped Blacks of a public forum, not to mention any substantive repre-
sentation in the administration."" Further, Reagan made affirmative
efforts to push back advances in civil rights for Blacks.' 7' Subsequent Re-
is, instead, the continuation of a theme.Tucker explains that Shealy studied the strategy of
the late Lee Atwater who, "despite his later renunciations of hateful demagoguery-clearly
influenced the campaign tactics of Republican presidential campaigns for years to come."
id.
There is also scholarship that identifies strategies for excluding Blacks as a part of a
traditional Republican philosophy. See e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republicani Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
166. Frymer, supra note 10, at 66.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See generally Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12. Guinier notes that, it is
hardly a coincidence that racial hostility increased during Reagan's eight-year administra-
tion, a hostility reflected in incidents of racial violence and unrest. Id. at 399 n.29. In fact,
Reagan's popularity could be attributed, in part, to his blatant appeals to the perception
that civil rights pohcies unfairly advantaged Blacks and other persons of color. Id. at 397.
170. Guinier notes that Reagan, among other unpleasantly conspicuous acts and omis-
sions,"made no effort to seek out or appoint traditional civil rights leaders." Id. at 394.
171. Guinier spends considerable time discussing the "Reagan-Reynolds" civil rights
legacy. In short, William Bradford Reynolds, in his position as Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights, was the "chief architect" of Reagan's civil rights program. Under Rey-
nolds' ideological and intellectual leadership, the "philosophic engines" of the Right were
deployed. "Propelled in part by the philosophic engines of New Right cost-benefit analy-
sis, the Administration attempted to drive civil rights laws out of the marketplace for being
more costly than they are worth." Id. at 396.
More specifically, and of greater relevance to the larger theme of this article, pri-
mary enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was left to those whose interests were
antithetical to the general Black interest. According to Guinier, with the leadership of
Attorneys General Smith and Meese and Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, conserva-
tive policymakers were able to "launch a profound assault on [the Civil Rights Division of
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publican administrations have done little to depart from, much less redress,
the racially partial approach of prior Republican administrations.
Vice President George H. W Bush marked his 1988 election cam-
paign by indicting Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis as a politician
who was soft on crime. As proof, Bush ran the infamous Willy Horton
television advertisements, in which the ex-felon and repeat offender's face
encapsulated for American voters what happens when Democrats are
"soft" on Black criminals.12 Bush's son, George W Bush, attempted to
make a slight departure from the more racially exclusive strategies of his
predecessors. With the exception of his ill-advised trip to Bob Jones Uni-
versity, Bush tried to strike a careful balance between "passionately"
opposing affirmative action, welfare, and federally mandated school inte-
gration, while attempting to appear "equally empathetic" to basic civil
rights principles, endorsement of Black politicians in high leadership posi-
tions, and his campaign promise to leave no child behind. 173 Black voters
were overwhelmingly immune to what they perceived as thinly veiled
attempts at inauthentic gestures towards racial harmony.'
74
It is no surprise, considering the above, that only ten percent of
Blacks believe that the GOP "is committed to the issues that are most
important to Blacks in America."', 7' Though many Blacks have a tendency
176toward social conservatism, that is, with respect to issues outside of so-
cial justice and civil rights, and as the Black middle class continues to
burgeon, their resistance to the Republican Party remains a "curious his-
torical anomaly."' 7 7 Even some of the Black community's most
the Department of Justice's] policies and goals, and upon those whom the Act was in-
tended to protect." Id. at 402-03.
172. Frymer, supra note 10, at 66.
173. Id. at 69. Needless to say, Bush was unconvincing to more than ninety percent of
Black voters on election day. According to Frymer, Bush received a smaller percentage of
the Black vote, yielding eight percent nationally, than any other Republican candidate
since 1964. Id. at 78 n.28.
174. This immunity is not new; in fact, it is the same song in a different decade.
Guinier, over a decade earlier, explained that though Black voters are frustrated with De-
mocrats' response, or lack thereof, to their interests, Blacks are "hardly convinced of the
sincerity of the Republican Party's nascent and token outreach." Guinier, Keepitg the Faith,
supra note 12, at 417.
175. Wickham, supra note 151. Conversely, sixty percent of African Americans said that
they believe that Democrats are committed to those issues. Id.
176. Exposing the Black community's closet conservatism, Cynthia Tucker states:
"Quiet as it is kept[,] ... Black Americans tend to be somewhat conservative on all social
issues except those related to social justice."Tucker, supra note 171, atA15.
177. Id. All things considered, Tucker is compelled to ask, "Why aren't affluent Blacks
and the GOP a happy match?"The short answer seems to be that the Party, and its deeper
devotion to the Right, is irreparably invidious. What is of even greater interest is that the
early 1990's produced some evidence that the match between Blacks and the Right could
have be made.
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conservative members have reservations about the GOP Quoted in 1987,
four years before his Supreme Court nomination debacle, Clarence Tho-
mas commented on the Right: "It often seemed that to be accepted
within the conservative ranks and to be treated with some degree of ac-
ceptance, a Black was required to become a caricature of sorts, providing
sideshows of anti-black quips and attacks."'
7
1
The Republican Party and the Black community, even in apparent
overlaps, is not an easy match. To be Republican, as it has come to mean
in many respects, requires, at best, an unpalatable disinterest in the civil
rights and social justice issues that in many ways define every aspect of the
Black community's political agenda. Black political participation, itself,
grew out of and because of devotion to these bedrock principles; from
this foundation of civil rights and social justice, the Black community
frames and struggles for all other issues.
VTHE POLITICAL AND ROMANTICVALUE OF THEVOTE
AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY
A. General Theory: Privilege vs. Right
The vote and the substance of the act of voting has been a particu-
larly contentious aspect of American democracy. Its link to ideological
notions of full citizenship as well as its practical relevance to empowering
individual members of the polity has made the vote a focal point of
struggle for marginalized communities throughout American history. The
vote itself, whether a mere symbol of membership in the polity or an ac-
tual exercise of power, holds a meaning that, regardless of source, is
significant. Its connection to American citizenship, and its attendant value, is
relatively uncontroversial. However, whether the vote is a right or a privi-
lege, and to whom that privilege is afforded, engenders greater dissent.
The notion of voting as a privilege, relative to notions of voting as a
right, tends to be attached to more exclusionary periods and characters
throughout America's history. In 1875, for example, the Supreme Court
upheld a lower court decision ruling that suffrage was not an inextricable
component of citizenship and that authority to determine who held the
Tucker reports on a 1991 USA Today poll that asked 400 African Americans the
following: "Some people say that blacks who hold conservative political views are out of
touch with the needs of blacks. Others say blacks have relied too much on government and
should embrace more conservative views. Which comes closest to your view?" Forty percent
of the respondents said that conservative Blacks were out of touch. Forty-one percent of
the Blacks polled thought that Black people should embrace conservatism. Nineteen per-
cent were not sure. Today, it seems that the more than 90% that leaned away from the
Republican ticket in 2000 are a better indicator of the political tide for Blacks. Id.
178. Id.
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privilege to vote was in the individual state.'79 In fact, most references to
women, in discourse surrounding the vote, was used to demonstrate the
very fact that voting was a privilege not a right.'g" Women were, after all,
citizens; yet, even for them, the rigors as well as the advantages of the vote
were not necessarily afforded.' 8' In fact, early in the women's suffrage
movement, women attempted to invoke the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the 14th Amendment to demand the right to vote. In the case
Minor v. Happersett,18 2 the Supreme Court echoed Chief Justice Taney's
reasoning in Dred Scott v. Sanford.'3 Taney argued that citizenship did not
include the right to vote. His evidence was that "exclusion from the fran-
chise did not prevent white women and minors from being members of
'the community who from [sic] the sovereignty.' "8
More recently, Guinier finds that this sentiment of voting as a privi-
lege persists. Among her evidence is the belief among local officials that
individual initiative to register to vote is a legitimate voting requirement.
For Guinier, that belief is consonant with the way in which "local officials
treat the franchise as a privilege that the voter must earn.,,15
Those who continue to operate under the belief that voting is a
privilege ignore the history of the vote as experienced by men of color
and women for the past two centuries.Those fights have been based upon
the strong conviction that access to the vote is a, if not the, defining char-
acteristic of citizenship. The two are, in fact, inextricably linked. To gain
access to the vote is the process by which one realizes authenticated citi-
zenship; and the reverse, though with much less romantic history, may also
be true.
This relationship strikes a particularly sharp chord with Blacks.Their
early existence in America was set against the backdrop of citizenship and
full humanity, to which they were denied admittance. In fact, Black peo-
ple in America played a significant role in defining citizenship by
embodying what citizenship was not. Judith Shklar provides piercing
analysis of the way in which Blacks worked as an oppositional
179. ALEXANDER Kr'ssAiR, TihE RIGHT TOVon 181 (2000). Keyssar notes that the ad-
vent of Black suffrage did not occur because this sentiment changed. According to Keyssar,
"Black suffrage triumphed-albeit temporarily-not because the polity had become con-
vinced of the virtues of equal rights or universal suffrage but due to the unique political
exigencies of Reconstruction and the political goals of the Republican Party." Id. at 183.
180. Id. at 175.
181. AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMEN, 1890-1920
28 (1965). "A vote," explains Kraditor, "was not simply the registering of an opinion; it
was a demand and consequently would be meaningless unless exercised only by the mus-
cular portion of the community." Id.
182. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
183. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). See Blacksher, supra note 30, at 730.
184. Blacksher, supra note 30, at 731 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 422
(1856).
185. Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 418.
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background against which the core values of this country developed.'"'
With respect to voting, Shklar argues "slavery was the background which
gave content to the notion of citizenship and suffrage. The ability to vote
has been partly justified as a way of distinguishing the citizen from the
slave, the truly human from the subhuman, the white from the Black.''
There is little wonder, as a result, that the right to vote would reso-
nate so profoundly with Black America. Since emancipation, membership
in the polity was less contradictory, in theory, for Blacks. As new citizens
they would, in varying degrees throughout history, demand the necessary
tools for participation in electoral politics, specifically, and in the democ-
racy, in general.
B. The Right to Vote
Myriad struggles for the vote are illustrative of a broadly perceived
understanding of voting as a right of citizenship. A far more quixotic no-
tion of the vote and citizenship was a driving force in the women's
suffrage movement. In 1867, Henry Ward Beecher, a staunch proponent
of women's rights, declared, "[S]uffrage is the inherent right of man-
kind.""' The vote's relationship to citizenship was without question.
Alexander Keyssar explains that women were "unquestionably" citizens. ' "
The vote, according to the suffragists, was an intrinsic feature of their citi-
zenship. It required citizenship for its disposition, political intelligence for
its execution," and power was its ultimate motivation.'
For White women, the suffrage movement hinged on struggles for
independence and autonomy, because their status as citizens was far less
186. Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2253 (1993). Addis, introducing his
analysis of Shklar's thesis, comments, "Some would argue that concepts like 'virtue,' 'fair-
ness,' and 'liberty' are, in this country, given concrete meaning by employing characteristics
attributable to blacks as oppositional backgrounds.There is some validity to the argument."
Id. at 2255 n.6.
187. Id. American citizenship, in its inception and through its formative years, necessar-
ily excluded Black people. Shklar asserts, "Americans lived with [slavery].... It was a
profound experience and was to put its mark on the most basic institutions of our public
life, American citizenship." JUDITH N. SHKILAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 17, 39-40 (1991),
quoted in Addis, supra note 186, at 2255 n.6.
188. Keyssar, supra note 179, at 178.
189. Id. at 180.
190. In his discussion of the ethos and sentiment of the women's suffrage movement,
Kraditor explains, "Voting implied much more than simply dropping a ballot in a box
once a year. It meant on the part of woman an entire intellectual reorientation. Having the
right to vote imposed the duty of exercising that right competently, which required doing
whatever was necessary to become politically intelligent." Kraditor, supra note 181, at 22.
191. At the 1851 Second National Convention on women's rights it was resolved that
"The Right to Suffrage is ... the corner-stone of this, since we do not seek to protect
woman, but rather to place her in a position to protect herself." Keyssar, supra note 179, at
176.
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controversial than that of other disenfranchised members of the populace.
For Blacks-though initially only for men with the ignificant
involvement of Black women not occurring until the Civil Rights
Movement-political independence and autonomy was a community-
wide achievement. In other words, the true significance of the vote was
that it had greater transformational aspirations." 2 In an illustrative quota-
tion, Martin Luther King,Jr. declared:
Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry the
federal government about our basic rights ... [G]ive us the
ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of good
will ... [G]ive us the ballot and we will help bring this na-
tion to a new society based on justice and dedicated to
193
peace.
Whereas the women's vote was for the triumph of the individual White
woman, voting for Blacks was, if completely and successfully actualized, a
nation-wide triumph ofjustice and change,
C. The Vote For African-Amnericans:A Political Narrative
The right to vote for Blacks begins and ends with commitment to
the community."4 That right is deemed as one of the most fundamental
for many in the Black community."' Jesse Jackson, for example, insists that
192. This is in sharp contrast to the maintenance of status quo that occurred after
women won the right to vote. James Blacksher notes, "It is a well known irony in Ameri-
can history that politics did not change very dramatically after [White] women were
enfranchised .... Class, race, ethnicity, and religion remained the more salient predictors of
a person's voting behavior." Blacksher, supra note 30, at 731.
193. Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 393 n.3 (quoting Martin Luther King,
Jr.).
194. Of course the initial granting of that right, post-Civil War and the during the
deconstruction era, did not include Black women.Yet the movement later was marked by
the involvement of vocal women like Fannie Lou Hamer, whose struggle for voting regis-
tration is remembered today and memorialized by a voting rights organization in her
name. For more information on the Fannie Lou Hamer Project see, http://www.flhp.org
(last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
195. Charles Hamilton Houston, one of the first and most prominent Black politicians,
saw the right to vote and the right to an education as the two most findamental rights.
See Nathaniel R.Jones, The Sysphean Inpact on HoustonianJurispmdence, 69 U. CIN. L. REV.
435,435 (2001).
It is important to note that not all of the prominent Black leaders saw the vote as
psychologically hopeful or politically valuable.WE.B. DuBois became increasingly disillu-
sioned by how ineffective his vote really was. See generally, WE.B. Dubois, I Won't
Vote, TiE NATION, Oct. 20, 1956, available at http://wwv.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?l=
1056102020&s=19561020dubois (last visited Apr. 8, 2003). DuBois decided that it would
be best to not vote at all rather than participate in a sham democracy. He asked, "Is the
refusal to vote in this phony election a counsel of despair? No, it is dogged hope." Id.
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"we need to be concerned about the link between voting and public pol-
icy."' 9 Guinier states that for the Black community the right to vote has
always been viewed as "the number one civil right," for it is an essential
tool in preserving "the traditional civil rights agenda.'"' 7 Certainly the
intense struggle fought for realization of that right suggests that electoral
power was crucial to liberation for Black people. James Blacksher offers a
concise description of the political climate that allowed Black political
action to bear fruit:
Cold War politics, the Vietnam War, the liberal democratic
tilt of the Warren Court, public revulsion from European to-
talitarianism, and unprecedented economic expansion all
helped make possible the Supreme Court's reinterpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause to include voting rights and
the corresponding passage of the Voting Rights Acts of 1965
and 1982. But nearly every step was explicitly or implicitly
sparked by the rise of black political action. Brown v. Board of
Education was the springboard for what became known as
the Civil Rights Movement, but the right of African Ameri-
cans to vote was the movement's "heart."98
The voting rights movement was marked by threatened and actual
violence against determined Blacks.'9 9 In fact, it was the manner in
which the Black community insisted on the right, in the face of vehe-
ment disapproval and roadblocks, that brought the battle to the public
eye. Specifically, the Voting Rights Act,-"' according to Pamela Karlan,
is a reflection of the "national consensus that American politics and gov-
ernance should be racially integrated. 2 2 With the Act, "nonwhite
voters . .. [would] become part of, rather than ... separate from, the po-
,,2113litical process.
196. Farrell & Johnson, supra note 69, at 1241 (quoting Reverend Jesse Jackson).
197. Guinier, Keeviig the Faith, sipra note 12, at 393 n.3.
198. Blacksher, supra note 30, at 732.
199. See id.; see also Lani Guinier, No Twvo Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77
VA. L. REv. 1413 (1991).
200. Blacksher, supra note 30, at 731-32.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. IV 1998). Primarily enforced by the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice, the Act has been steered by Section 2, a nationwide
prohibition on discriminatory elections schemes, and Section 5, an administrative
monitoring mechanism for electoral changes in covered jurisdictions of the Act. See
Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 399 n.32. In the last two decades, the Supreme
Court has used strict scrutiny analysis to restrict the reach of the 1965 Voting Rights Act
to deny affirmative opportunities for Blacks. Frymer, supra note 10, at 71.
202. Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatisn? Voting Rights As An Anerican Nationalities Policy,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 83-84 (1995).
203. Id. at 84.
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According to Guinier, under the Voting Rights Act the right to vote
necessarily entailed the right to "fair and effective" representation. 2"And
the underlying assumption of the Act, and the larger importance of its
success, is that political interests may correlate with membership in racial
and ethnic groups. 2 ' Further, it is corrective in that it operates under the
additional assumption that those interests may not be valued fairly in the
electoral system as it is contemporarily configured ..
Though the Voting Rights Act represents a tangible advance in elec-
toral politics, perhaps the greater success of the voting rights movement
was a more clearly developed and defined articulation of an African-
American political narrative. According to Laurence Thomas, the es-
sence of the real pain of slavery was the inability for Blacks to create their
own narrative. The freedom of Blacks to formulate their own national
narrative and to achieve autonomy would allow Blacks to be "not merely
formal equals with other Americans before the law, but coauthors of the
law, comembers of 'We the People: who form the nation that gives its
consent to legitimate, constitutional government.' Generally, a narrative
is "a set of stories which defines values and entirely positive goals, which
specifies a set of fixed points of historical significance, and which defines a
set of ennobling rituals to be regularly performed."2"9 A political narrative,
therefore, would be an articulation of the values and goals that, historically
informed, is driven by participation in traditional methods of political
204. Guinier, No Tio Seats, supra note 200, at 1417.
205. Karlan, supra note 202.
206. Id. This is crucial once the struggle for the right to vote has been successful, as
Guinier asserts. She advises that after first fighting for the "basic" right, voting rights advo-
cates seek a "meaningful" vote. Meaningful suggests that the vote cast is able to elect
candidates of the Black community's choosing. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 200, at
1415.
207. Here it is important to address a concern about the essentializing of the Black
community with respect to its goals, political motivations, and the sense of a clearly
bounded and definable community itself. Guinier's disclaimer, of sorts, briefly states my
own understanding of a Black political consciousness. She says, "Generalizations about the
concerns of African Americans or blacks are not an attempt to describe a single, mono-
lithic viewpoint, but reflect the consistent political cohesion that black voters display."
Guinier, Keeping die Faith, supra note 12, at 393 n.2.
Of course, this belief has been the subject of legal controversy. See, e.g., Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994), in which Justice Clarence Thomas states, inter alia, "[W]e have
devised a remedial mechanism that encourages federal courts to segregate voters into ra-
cially designated districts to ensure minority electoral success. In doing so, we have
collaborated in what may aptly be termed the racial 'balkanization' of the Nation." Id. at
2592. See generally Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), in which Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the Court, states that drawing electoral lines to acconmodate a racial or ethnic
group is based on the false notion, in her opinion, that African Americans have "little in
common with one another but the color of their skin." Id. at 2827.
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empowerment in the appropriate marketplace (i.e., voting). A narrative
and autonomy is "prerequisite to entering the constitutional compact."
210
And a narrative is vital in a "hostile society."-' Thomas argues that Blacks
"cannot flourish in a hostile society, [because] it is only having a narrative
that, in a hostile society, a people can have assistance born of respect in-
stead of pity."'212 For African-Americans, that narrative and autonomy is
based in, and on behalf of, the community.
D. The Connunity: Origins and Current Manifestations.
The concept of the individual is usually subordinate to a group ori-
entation. It is the group that is important, and the Black self is an
incorporated part of the social group. "Cooperation through collective
efforts is the accepted means of achieving culturally prescribed goals.'
'21 3
The "community" has a rich history and a full definition for Blacks.
The individual, which is a focal point in American culture, remains im-
portant but a careful second to the needs of the Black community at large.
According to many, the source of the individual's allegiance to commu-
nity is as old as or older than, the Middle Passage. Voting, consequently, is
an outgrowth of a worldview that is made for us and by us.
Chiekh Anta Diop, for example, goes as far as to assert that Black
communal goals and actions have been influenced by African values on
collectivism and universal ownership."4 Our political activity, therefore,
may track an age-old philosophy of collective successes and failures. Yet,
even if one is skeptical about the authentically African source of this
group activity, it is true that "common sense suggests that groups of peo-
ple systematically segregated from each other will develop distinctive
cultures over time. 2 1 1 Of course, and perhaps more accurately, the combi-
nation of these two sources-that is ancient culture and modern-day




213. VinceneVerdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It:An Analysis of Reparations to African Ameri-
cans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597,625 (1993)(quoting ROBERT STAPLES, INTRODUCTION TO BLACK
SOCIOLOGY 78 (1976)).
214. Id. According toVerdun, "Philosophers in this group argue that these values have
manifested in different ways depending on the African community and time period exam-
ined; however, each value has survived as a staple of the African world view to the present
day." Id. at 616.
215. Id. at 617.
216. Verdun defines culture as inclusive of values that can be identified with a group
and does not purport to establish a Black point of view. She questions the existence of
such a viewpoint.Verdun explains that "[t]he African American consciousness described in
this Article identifies a perspective that is prevalent in the African American community,
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chewing essentialist analysis of the "community," it would not be outra-
geous to identify and explore a Black consciousness that certainly
manifests a political voice.27
After all, considering the political and legal history that all Blacks
were forced to negotiate at different times throughout American history,
the experience of oppression was singular and limited enough to militate
in favor of a constant and continuing community mandate. As Vincene
Verdun offers, "The struggles and hardships of African Americans, caused
by living in a nation founded on principles of racial inequality, have led to
the evolution of common values, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, and perspec-
tives."28
That difference in history has created a dichotomy between the
dominant 2 " American culture, and its behaviors in the political market-
place, and the (distinctively un-American) Community culture that colors
the general proclivities of African-American consumers in the political
marketplace. For the dominant culture-which defines "normal," savvy,
strategic voting activity-the African-American voting block is oddly
inefficient, and thus without valuable or productive political capital, and
less likely to be fully and consistently accommodated by both political
and jurisprudential forces.
Further, the dominant culture influences the distribution of rights.
Rights, under this cultural perspective, are afforded to the individual
rather than communities, and this approach is largely immutable."0 In fact,
Robert Cottrol argues that it is not at all an excisable aspect of the
American cultural fabric. He argues, "This individualistic approach cannot
be lightly set aside without doing violence to much of American
constitutional doctrine, doctrine that has been painfully achieved over the
but it is not the exclusive or essentialist voice of the African American conmmunity." Id. at
617 n.53.
217. An essentialist analysis would be one that assumes that all Black people can be
categorized as subscribing to this communal approach alone or to the same degree. I make
these general comments humbly, recognizing that they are just trends,educated speculation,
or both; they certainly do not attempt to speak for all.
218. Verdun, supra note 213, at 600.Verdun identifies the argument of proponents of an
"African American consciousness" as spawning from generations of survival as an op-
pressed people in hostile environment and rooted in African culture and heritage, "which
survived the trip across the Atlantic Ocean and the institution of slavery." Id. at 610.Ver-
dun also quotes Gerald Torres on this issue. He says, "Members of a self-conscious
subculture, through identification with their group, are able to construct and identify a
place within the larger society that provides a relatively autonomous sphere within which
social life is lived and created, even if primary identification remains with the subgroup."
Id. at 619.
219. The dominant perspective describes a "system of values and perceptions conmmon
to the group that exercises economic, political, and ideological control over society"White
members of American society usually subscribe to this perspective; it is the conceptual
goggles through which they understand the depths of their participation in the polity. Id.
220. See generally id. at 624 n.85 (discussing Robert Cottrol).
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tutional doctrine, doctrine that has been painfully achieved over the
course of two centuries.*
2 '
Sociologist Robert Staples offers an analysis of the dominant
(White) culture and its ideological opposite that is the Black culture. He
describes the value orientations of White Americans on individualism in
the following manner:
In human society each individual must make his own mark
through competition for the prestige goals of his culture.
The rewards of his victory in the competition are his alone,
to be shared only with certain prescribed people (e.g., wife,
children) over whom he has control. Those who have not
achieved success or are without sufficient resources have
only themselves to blame because of their inability to com-
pete.
In sharp contrast, Black culture distinguishes itself by subsuming the
individual to larger community goals. The political significance of this
activity, and its relevance to this article's thesis, is that voting with devo-
tion to principal is not only a learned habit but also a necessity by
definition. The vote is the true disposition of all to which the Commu-
nity aspires. It is powerfully aspirational; bare strategy is perhaps a very
distant second. Robert Ezra Park's analysis of the Black community in
1950 still rings incredibly true today:
It is the necessity for collective action, the necessity that
Negroes should cooperate to win for themselves the place
and the respect in the white man's world that the Constitu-
tion could not give them, that has created among the
Negroes of the United States a solidarity that does not exist
elsewhere. Race consciousness is the natural and inevitable
reaction to race prejudice.223
Though not savvy, devotion to principled and community oriented po-
litical action is perhaps more true to the actions of voters at the pinnacle
of political participation. It is not clear that most, or at least half, of Blacks
can or should depart from principle-driven voting. Pure strategy may be
antithetical to what the vote can and should be imbued with by all
Americans, especially vote-hungry and often principle-bereft politicians.
However, with these ideological triumphs, the Community will continue
to be political losers under the current market scheme.
221. Verdun, supra note 213, at 624 n.85.
222. Id. at 619.
223. ROBERT E. PARK, RACE AND CULTURE 294 (1950), quoted in Verdun, supra note 213,
at 613.
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VI. ONE PARTY WITH Two NAMES
I believe that democracy has so far disappeared in the United States
that no "two evils" exist. There is but one evil party tvith two
224naines ...
The two-party system, in which only Republicans and Democrats
participate -in the political ring, is structurally disadvantageous for African-
Americans. Republicans and Democrats alike remain deafeningly silent
with regard to race. In fact, the complete elision of race has become a
more politically correct manner of navigating political discourse and de-
bate. The result tends to be that "[w]hile silence may mean the absence of
racist expressions, it can also mean the absence of opportunities for the
promotion of racial equality.'"2'5 A cursory look at the actions of each
party supports the latter proposition. 2 " As a result, the two-party system,
by virtue of being comprised of these two parties, allows issues of race to
remain off of the political stage, much less the foreground.
Professor Frymer argues that two-party politics is not, despite popu-
lar notions, essential for democratic progress. Instead it serves as "one of
the most important ways in which the ideas and ideologies that are
224. DuBois, supra note 195. The full quotation reads as follows: "In 1956, 1 shall not
go to the polls. I have not registered. I believe that democracy has so far disappeared in the
United States that no 'two evils' exist. There is but one evil party with two names, and it
will be elected despite all I can do or say." DuBois also had trouble identifying a viable and
worthy third party as his voting preferences were "limited by the candidates' attitude to-
ward Negroes." In addition, participation in alternative parties, such as the Socialists, was
suspect in an increasingly jingoistic American society. To DuBois, it was not clear that
America could hold a fair election on real issues. His cynicism with respect to democracy
in America was deep. He insists, "Stop yelling about a democracy we don't have. Democ-
racy is dead in the United States." Id.
225. Frymer, supra note 10, at 62.
226. Frymer explains that the Democratic Party, in order not to "startle" conservative
White voters, leave race off the agenda, "while delicately balancing subtle race-specific
appeals at different moments to both black and white voters." Id. at 64. Republicans, on
the other hand, "try to win elections by making direct appeals to white voters without
portraying the party as out of the mainstream on race matters." Id. Republicans, unapolo-
getically, are almost totally disconnected from Black voters. Id.
Frymer further argues that the two-party system is, in fact, dependent upon the eli-
sion of racial matters. He writes:
[T]he reason we can have two party competition in the US is exactly be-
cause racial matters are suppressed. Were African American interests
prominently advocated on a consistent basis in electoral politics, the two-
party system would break down because one party would consistently
win and the other would consistently lose. Thus, an essential element of
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comiriunicated in national political campaigns denies a multi-racial politi-c a l " . , , 2 2 7
cal viewpoint. In spite of this reality, the major structures of our
government remain wedded to this system. A series of Supreme Court
cases are illustrative.2 2 " Departing from its noteworthy advances in civil
rights, specifically voting rights, from the 1950s to the 1970s, 229 the Court
in the last decade has been largely unresponsive to the electoral needs and
concerns of African-Americans. With respect to third parties, it has made
proactive efforts to limit the possibility of third party successes.The Court
steadfastly endorses the two-party system, believing that it serves a posi-
tive role in democracy, holding that the "'States' interest permits them to
enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the tradi-
tional two-party system."' To that end it has allowed the exclusion of
third parties from televised public debates as well as denying efforts to
allow non-affiliated voters to participate in party primaries.
23
1
Without question, the two parties continue to find it electorally ad-
vantageous to ignore issues surrounding race. Many Black scholars and
politicians believe this proposition so strongly that they insist that Black
Community interests will only be addressed once the current system is
abandoned .232 Lani Guinier, for example, believes that Blacks have been
particularly stifled by the two-party system, 3 and she has written impor-
tant scholarship on alternative voting schemes.2 4 For Guinier, alternative
voting practices, like cumulative voting,2 5 not only allow for a more ef-
fective voice for Blacks, they also promote the equally important goal of
coalition building. She argues:
227. Id. Frymer is also persuaded by the calls for structural reform with respect to our
party choices. He argues, "Given the power of our two-party system to maintain a racial
discourse that is profoundly disadvantageous to racial equality, such reforms are vital in the
promotion of a more inclusive democracy." Id. at 60.
228. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990)(Scalia, J., dis-
senting)("The stabilizing effects of such a [two-party] system are obvious."); Davis i'.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986)(O'Connor, J., concurring)("There can be little doubt
that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed
enormously to sound and effective government."); Branti v. Finkel 445 U.S. 507, 532
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)("broad-based political parties supply an essential coherence
and flexibility to the American political scene") noted in Frymer, supra note 10, at 79 n.46.
229. See generally Frymer, supra note 10, at 69-72.
230. Tinnons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,367 (1997).
231. Frymer, supra note 10, at 72.
232. Id. at 74-75.
233. Guinier, Keeping the Faith, supra note 12, at 394. This reality is particularly danger-
ous because people may withdraw or, perhaps hopefully, seek nonsysten means of action
in response to an unresponsive political system. Id. at 417.
234. See e.g., Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 1 (1995); LANI
GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOC-
RACY (1994) [hereinafter TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY].
235. For an introduction to alternative voting schemes, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL.,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2001).
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As a solution that permits voters to self-select their identi-
ties, cumulative voting also encourages cross-racial coalition
building. No one is locked into a minority identity. Nor is
anyone necessarily isolated by the identity they choose.Vot-
ers can strengthen their influence by forming coalitions to
elect more than one representative.!2
3
6
Irregardless of the specific scheme chosen, however, the vital goal is a de-
parture from the current system in which the Black community is
entrenched. It seems clear that the two avenues of political participation
are without true direction with respect to the interests of Blacks. It seems
that our political capital would be squandered with either party. That we
are devoted to Democrats is not as tragic, all things considered, as our so-
ciety's devotion to the two-party system.
I am in full agreement with those scholars who argue that the cur-
rent two-party system thrives on the elision of race in complex and
meaningful political discourse and action. Further, I am convinced that a
restructuring of the system will open the doors for politicians who are
willing to be firm and consistent advocates for the Black Community.
CONCLUSION
At present, Blacks are confined by their attachment to the Democ-
ratic Party. It is plausible that if we were to follow the "consumer" model
demonstrated by Latino voters, our political attachments, or more impor-
tantly non-attachments, will be far more liberating. Blacks, however, are
not likely to follow this model, favoring instead a community-based view
of value and meaning in the right to vote and practice of voting. This
community-based view also disfavors the Republican Party due to actual
and ideological conflicts between Republicans and Black people in
America. Therefore, even if Blacks were to contemplate strategic voting,
their alternative party choice is wholly unappealing. In sum, however, it is
the two-party system that is weakening the African-American vote. It fails
by systemically discouraging ideologically driven votes.
Because of these failures, until there is a restructuring of the entire
party system, the Black community should continue to vote its con-
science. Though it might make the community political losers, it is
remaining true to the meaning of a right for which it has nobly struggled.
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